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International Tax Relations: Theory
and Implications
DIANE RING*
I. INTRODUCTION
Governments rely heavily on taxes to fund their operations. If the
business transactions subject to tax are entirely domestic, a country
wields considerable power to implement a tax system and collect the
designated taxes. But if the transactions cross national borders, who
taxes them? Whose rules apply? And, perhaps most important, what
happens when countries disagree? Who "prevails" and why? These
are serious, critical, and relevant questions for which there are few
answers. The dominant focus of international tax literature has been
an analysis of substantive tax law and its implications. Receiving
much less attention is how countries have come to agree on particular
tax rules and practices-the international relations of international
tax.
The vast majority of tax rules are "domestic" in that they are en-
acted and enforced by a single state. That characterization, however,
belies the inherently international nature of the subject. Many income
tax rules directly affect large numbers of nonresident taxpayers en-
gaged in cross border transactions and indirectly affect other nations.
As early as the 1920's, countries began negotiating over the content
and contours of income tax rules.1 The outcome of such negotiations
determines each country's prospects for tax revenues and for invest-
ment. Countries, though, are not the only participants in international
tax debates.2 Tax professionals and taxpayers, especially multina-
tional corporations, actively seek to understand, influence, and shape
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I would like to thank the American
Tax Policy Institute for its research grant funding this project. I am grateful for comments
from Hugh Ault, Reuven Avi-Yonah, James Repetti, Stephen Shay, and the participants in
the Harvard Law School Seminar on Current Tax Research. I would also like to thank
Arnulf Becker Lorca for his valuable research assistance.
I See note 14 and Subsection II.B.2.
2 "International tax" has no formal or specific definition. It generally refers to the sub-
set of income tax rules of a country that govern (1) the taxation of residents of the country
earning income outside of the country, and (2) the taxation of nonresidents earning income
inside that country. In addition, income tax treaties, which are bilateral agreements negoti-
ated between countries, are included under the umbrella of international tax.
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international tax law and policy. The current landscape reveals an
enormous array of mechanisms by which the international tax system3
is influenced and these mechanisms vary tremendously in size, formal-
ity, membership, participation, subject matter, and output. Relatively
little attention has been devoted to understanding how these forces
shape international tax policy-the focus on the "tax" piece of inter-
national tax has been at the expense of the "international" aspect, the
unique and complex dynamics of multijurisdictional relations. Coun-
tries not only must construct domestic tax policies and rules; they also
must navigate the intersections with other countries' systems.
The time has come to shift, or perhaps expand, the scope of tax
analysis to include examination of the dynamics of multijurisdictional
relations. This claim prompts two questions: "Why now?" and "Isn't
this addressed elsewhere?" As to the first, the multilateral nature of
international tax has long been understood. Two important features
of the tax world have changed, however: (1) the volume of cross bor-
der business 4 and (2) the structure and form of that business.5 While
both elements are widely discussed, their importance in affecting the
dynamics and interactions that generate, develop, and change the in-
ternational tax regime has not been explored. The increasing volume
of activity and of participants intensifies the need for good cross bor-
der tax policy,6 and good policy requires more than good rules. It
3 Unless otherwise specified, the use of the term "regime" or "system" connotes the
generic and broad usage of these terms in the international tax literature, and not the more
specific (though often contradictory) uses of the terms in international relations theory,
which are examined more specifically in Part II.C.
4 See, e.g., Foundations of International Income Taxation 1 fig.1.1 (Michael Graetz ed.,
2003) (showing increase in U.S.-owned assets abroad from roughly $3 billion in 1990 to
over $8 billion in 2001, and increase in foreign-owned assets in the United States from over
$2 billion in 1990 to over $6 billion in 2001).
5 See generally Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Latest U.S. IRS Data Show
Jump in Tax Haven Profits, 36 Tax Notes Int'l 202, 202 (Oct. 18, 2004) (revealing "large
increase in foreign profits of U.S. multinationals despite stalled profit growth in the United
States"); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Truth About Offshore Outsourcing
and Profit Shifting by U.S. Corporations, 33 Tax Notes Int'l 951, 951-52 (Mar. 15, 2004)
(arguing that the number of workers employed by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations
increased by 39% from 1995-2001 as compared to a domestic increase of 10%); Michelle
Markham, Tax in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing of Intangible Assets, 40 Tax
Notes Int'l 895, 895 (Dec. 5, 2005) ("[The] new economy of the 21st century has seen
business enterprises, particularly multinational businesses, divesting themselves of tangible
assets while turning to intangible assets to enhance their standing in a world increasingly
focused on technological innovation.").
6 Although existing rules may have identifiable and known weaknesses, the limited vol-
ume of transactions or higher transactions costs of the past have operated as a friction on
potential abuse of the rules. As the volume increases and the frictions decrease, the back-
stop for abuse is weakened and the underlying rules must be confronted directly.
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demands an ability to get them implemented in a multijurisdictional
tax world.
7
The failure to anticipate other countries' views or the interactions of
their rules with your own can have potentially dramatic effects, includ-
ing loss of revenue (to other countries or to double nontaxation),8 in-
creased antipathy to international investment, 9 fairness concerns, 10
increased administrative costs (as countries try to pursue regimes that
are increasingly unworkable)," and misallocation of investment and
commercial activity.12 To avoid these counterproductive clashes,
countries must be able to reach agreement on tax issues that require
coordination for successful implementation. This need for agreement
is not new, but the escalating number of important intersections be-
tween countries' rules increases the pressure to secure agreement.
This conclusion leads to the second question, "Isn't the subject of
how countries reach agreement addressed elsewhere?" The answer is
yes, and no. The study of the interactions among multiple participants
in a global setting is the subject of an independent field of inquiry,
international relations. Unfortunately, the literature and analysis in
the international relations area rarely use taxation as a case study for
the theories of international relations. 13 Thus, a nuanced understand-
ing of the application of international relations theory in the interna-
tional tax realm is missing. This Article begins to fill this gap by
exploring how international relations analysis of the international tax
system could improve decisionmaking in the international tax arena.
7 A country's success in implementing its tax rules can depend in part on the impact
those rules have on other countries and the responses that those rules generate.
8 See, e.g., Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-
Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 79, 81 (2002) (taxpayers using arbitrage to eliminate
tax liability); Michael Lang, General Report, Double Non-Taxation, 89a Cahiers de Droit
Fisc. Int'l 73, 77-119 (2004) (exploring the problem of international double nontaxation of
income and the array of current and potential responses).
9 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis
of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573, 1575-78 (2000); Julie Roin, Competition and
Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 Geo. L.J. 543, 547-48
(2001).
10 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, note 9, at 1616-26.
'1 See, e.g., Roin, note 9, at 570-76.
12 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, note 9, at 1604-16.
13 Game theory analysis, a prominent part of some international relations analysis, ap-
pears in several notable works on international taxation. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, note 9, at
1583; Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 939, 948-77 (2000);
Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Govern-
ments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 Yale J. Int'l L. 79,
104-10 (1998); Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to In-
ternational Tax Arbitrage, 53 Emory L.J. 89, 122-28 (2004); Roin, note 9, at 550-54. None
of these works focused on the general question of how to examine comprehensively the
interaction of states in the sphere of international taxation and the development of agree-
ment on a range of topics.
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The theoretical and practical aspects of negotiating with many sover-
eigns in an interactive political and economic environment require
specific attention. 14 This Article starts bridging international relations
theory and international tax law with the ultimate aim of determining
how countries reach agreement over international tax and how that
knowledge can improve tax policy and tax negotiations. To test the
proposition that the study of international relations will enhance inter-
national tax analysis, this Article identifies the most promising analyti-
cal direction in international relations theory and applies that theory
to the most widely known example of international tax negotiations
among countries: the development of a system to relieve double taxa-
tion. Using this classic case study, the Article argues that the addi-
tional perspective and insight of international relations theory can
enhance our understanding of an established tax story. Ideally, such
knowledge allows us to predict and, more importantly, modify the
contours of international tax relations. The Article also outlines an
agenda for further research on these issues with the expectation that
extensive case study projects are the foundation of predictive gui-
dance on international tax relations.
Part II begins by establishing the normative goals of the tax system
and then evaluating international relations theory for use in tax de-
bates. Part III examines the application of international relations the-
ory to the double taxation case study to cast this well-known example
in a new light. The Article evaluates which models of international
relations theory seem most pertinent to the structure, issues, and dy-
namics of international tax. Building on these conclusions, Part III
proposes an international relations-international tax research agenda
that would develop the international relations analytical approach and
extend the inquiry into many important substantive and procedural
issues in the international tax system. The task of exposing the link
with international relations theory and exploring it in detail brings
some common intuitions, past experience, and perhaps misconcep-
tions to the fore. The Conclusion considers further interaction be-
tween the tax and international relations fields, as well as limits on the
ability of international relations to improve tax policy. Not only is the
14 The claim here is not that strategic issues of international tax have been ignored (for
example, consider the initial efforts to compose international committees for drafting trea-
ties in the 1920's). Rather, the rich and extensive work in international relations theory
that has been pursued over the past decades has not been integrated into international tax
analysis. See text accompanying notes 30-34; Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The
"Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46 Duke L.J. 1021, 1043-56, 1066-76
(1997) (describing development of the foreign tax credit in the United States and of the
International Chamber of Commerce's Double Taxation Committee's approach to the
problem of double taxation).
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tax world called upon to integrate important areas of nontax research
into its universe, but scholars and researchers in the area of interna-
tional relations theory are exhorted to take seriously the international
experiences of the tax system, especially as nonmilitaristic aspects of
international relations form an increasingly central part of interna-
tional relations theory. A marriage of international relations theory
and international tax-in research, analysis, and application-should
advance both fields.
II. DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY FRAMEWORK
FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX
A. Introduction
The ultimate quest of this project, as well as much of international
tax literature, is to improve tax policy. This goal requires a vision of
what constitutes "good" tax policy - and how that will be measured.
It also requires flexibility in exploring avenues outside of traditional
tax analyses that may clarify important operational aspects of the in-
ternational tax system. This Part outlines these two fundamental com-
ponents of successful tax policy (a desired tax rule and a model of tax
relations). First, and more briefly, given its relative ubiquity in the
literature, the goals of the tax system are defined and probed to iden-
tify their essential parts and their ambiguous or contradictory ele-
ments. Second, international relations theory is examined to identify
the research and theoretical models most likely to inform analysis of
the international tax system.
B. Normative Goals of the International Tax System
The basic goals other than revenue of the international tax system
are the same ones generally espoused for domestic tax policy: effi-
ciency, equity, and administrability. The list is simple; the contextual
application is quite difficult. In the domestic setting these criteria are
challenging to implement. Indeed, the components can even be diffi-
cult to measure because of informational limits (for example, in effi-
ciency-oriented analyses) or uncertainty in the normative dimension
of the standard itself (what constitutes equitable tax treatment). Al-
though in theory one can analyze the efficiency and equity effects of a
single provision, the picture is incomplete without consideration of
other tax provisions. Even when tentative conclusions can be reached
regarding the efficiency, equity or administrative effects of a given tax
treatment, there remains the question of how to balance the three cri-
teria in judging the desirability of a specific provision.
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In the international context, additional questions arise due to multi-
ple sovereign taxing authorities, many of which are interested in the
same taxable transactions. What do efficiency and equity mean in the
global context? How do they impact the likelihood of reaching agree-
ment on international tax matters? Starting with efficiency, should
the goal of international tax be worldwide efficiency (either capital
export 15 or capital import neutrality16)? What if that clashes with na-
tional efficiency? 17 The dominant approach in economics literature
has been to evaluate international tax rules and policy in terms of
worldwide efficiency.18 This theoretical starting point seems quite dis-
tant from the real world behavior of nations, given the potential for
conflict between worldwide efficiency and national interests. If the
goal is to understand and predict how nations reach agreement, then a
willingness to examine a "national" perspective on negotiations is
necessary. 19
With respect to equity, what should be made of "inter-nation" eq-
uity-a factor not present in the purely domestic analysis? 20 What
kinds of claims can nations make upon one another regarding the im-
15 A particular tax rule is deemed capital export neutral (CEN) if a taxpayer is neutral,
that is, indifferent, as between a domestic and a foreign investment with the same pretax
rate of return. De facto, the taxpayer must be facing the same marginal tax rate for either
investment. See, e.g., Office of Tax Pol'y, Treasury Dep't, The Deferral of Income Earned
Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study 23, 26-27, 36-37 (Dec.
2000), reprinted in 2001 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Jan. 3, 2001, at S-3, S-13-S-14.
16 If a rule favors certain investors among the universe of those who might import capi-
tal into in a single market, then the rule violates capital import neutrality (CIN)-and thus
distorts savings incentives, and may impact the competitiveness of business. For CIN to
exist, all investments made in a particular country should be taxed at the same effective tax
rate, regardless of the identity of the taxpayer. Essentially, the total tax burden borne by
all taxpayers investing in the country should be the same, even though the taxpayers may
be based in a wide range of countries. See Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast
Lecture, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and
Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L. Rev. 261, 272 (2001).
17 See, e.g., id. at 270, 277-82.
18 See, e.g., id. at 276.
19 Even with that premise, however, there remains the task of measuring efficiency, in
particular the choice between CEN and CIN, although some analysts reject both CEN and
CIN as potentially too narrow, and instead encourage a broader vision of economic neu-
trality. See, e.g., Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old
and New Approaches, 47 Tax Notes 581, 586-87 (Apr. 30, 1990). Unless the tax bases and
the tax rates across countries are the same, it is not possible for a rule to satisfy both CEN
and CIN. See note 16 and Graetz, note 16, at 272. Moreover, despite the dominance of
the worldwide approach to measuring efficiency (through the use of either CEN or CIN),
some have advocated a rethinking of the importance of national efficiency and whether it
has a valid place in the efficiency analysis. After all, tax is somewhat unusual in that it
typically assumes little weight for national efficiency. In many nontax contexts we expect
that nations, including the United States, will measure options from their own point of
view and pursue what they understand to be their interests. See Graetz, note 16, at 276-82.
20 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, note 9, at 1616, 1631-51.
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pact of tax rules on different nations? 21 The question of inter-nation
equity incorporates both political and moral judgment.2 2 Although
domestic equity analysis does not encounter this question, the domes-
tic literature on equity may be valuable for its exploration of what
constitutes the source and nature of commitments to equity. To the
extent it proceeds from explicit participation and membership in a
common political venture (a single state), the conclusions may differ
in an international context. In any event, each taxing authority's view
of equity (just like each authority's view of efficiency) may differ
starkly if the authority is considering the welfare of its own state
rather than adopting a broader global view.23
Efficiency and equity questions also affect the third prong of tax
policy-administrability and implementation. It is insufficient to sim-
ply determine the desired tax rules or regime for a given international
tax problem. Unless actually implemented, the rules are useless. Ad-
ministrability is critical and tenuous in international tax where execu-
tion of tax policy frequently requires agreement2 4 among states on the
issue. Enactment of domestic legislation is often inadequate to
achieve the intended tax policy. The tax rules and decisions of other
jurisdictions are crucial to the bottom line for taxpayers with cross
border income and for countries seeking to tax them. Thus, to effec-
tively implement a desired tax policy it may be necessary to persuade
other countries to participate in a shared vision, at least to some de-
gree. Under what conditions are countries likely to agree? In answer-
ing this question, the Article turns to international relations theory
and analysis.
Certainly, all three basic goals of any tax system demand recogni-
tion of extra-national concerns. Even if a nation takes a parochial
view of equity or efficiency, administrability will require international
policy coordination (and this in turn may require a readjustment of
21 In this context it is important to distinguish between "equity-like" arguments that
really are efficiency claims in disguise-for example, an argument that a given tax rule
benefits Country A at the expense of Country B and thus is undesirable on equity grounds,
may be bolstered by observations that if the tax rule is implemented, the likely repercus-
sions (including avoidance behavior and fall-out from declining economic conditions) will
negatively impact Country A. This latter argument is less about equity and more about
providing a complete assessment of the benefits and costs of the proposed policy-an effi-
ciency argument.
22 Except to the extent that one seeks to recast even these questions as part of an effi-
ciency framework, which mutes their independent analytical and explanatory value.
23 This complexity in the equity calculation helps explain the findings discussed later in
the Article regarding states' interest in relative gains from an international arrangement.
Specifically, in assessing options, states may care whether "everyone gains" or whether
"they gain more than everyone else." See text accompanying notes 30-34.
24 Agreement can take place on a variety of levels, such as bilateral treaties or model
agreements.
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acceptable equity or efficiency results). This need to coordinate pro-
vides a powerful impetus to develop a viable application of interna-
tional relations to tax. The need is even greater than may first appear.
Tax policy is not made in an international vacuum. Other aspects of
international relations may impede or facilitate discussions of the tax-
ing authorities. 25 International disputes in unrelated arenas may pre-
vent negotiations or the consummation of agreements. 26 Moreover,
because tax ties directly into the economic engine that is central to
international power and prestige, it may be challenging to obtain
agreement.
2 7
The following section identifies the domains of international rela-
tions theory that are valuable in assessing agreement in the interna-
tional tax setting. It is important to reiterate that expansion of tax
analysis to include applications of international relations theory will
not miraculously eliminate the challenges of international tax. Many
of the core and persistent problems of international tax derive from
the sometimes intractable dilemmas of efficiency, equity, adminis-
trability, and the competition for tax revenue. Nevertheless, any in-
formation that improves our ability to forecast and pursue agreements
is important.
C. Mining International Relations Theory to Improve International
Tax Policy
1. General Landscape of International Relations Theory
The international relations literature is rich and complex, address-
ing a wide range of important questions about the conduct of interna-
tional relations, including the ways in which agreement is reached (or
25 See, e.g., IRC § 901(j) (denying credit for foreign taxes paid to a country if: (1) the
United States does not recognize the government, (2) the United States has "severed dip-
lomatic relations" with the country (or simply does not conduct relations with the country);
or (3) the country is designated by the Secretary of State as one "which repeatedly pro-
vides support for acts of international terrorisms"). Countries currently identified by the
Service as falling under § 901(j) include Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Rev.
Rul. 2005-3, 2005-1 C.B. 334.
26 For example, consider the absence of treaties with countries such as those identified
in note 25.
27 In some situations, nontax issues will be integrated into tax analysis at an early stage
either as a factor in efficiency or equity, or through additional policy arguments raised in
the midst of the tax debate itself. For example, states (and taxpayers) often argue that
their sovereignty is being undermined. Although sovereignty typically is not defined, the
term tends to invoke an image of harm to the ability of the nation to speak for itself and to
make decisions that further its national interests in the global sphere. The role and mean-
ing of sovereignty has been extensively considered in international relations theory, and an
illumination of that concept should better inform consideration of such claims with regard
to tax policy.
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not) at the international level. The task is to locate the international
relations literature that asks how and under what circumstances agree-
ment can be reached internationally. The field of international rela-
tions research directed at this question, "international regime theory,"
is a sensible starting point. The next Subsection outlines in some de-
tail the contours of international regime theory in an effort to draw
from that literature a model for analyzing the international tax system.
This Subsection briefly reviews the foundations of international rela-
tions theory to provide context for the discussion of regime theory to
follow.
At a broad theoretical level, two important traditions, neorealism
and neoliberalism, drive international relations analysis.28 Neorealism
emphasizes: (1) the state as the central (and rational) actor in the
international arena; (2) the state's desire to achieve relative gains over
other states (thus the attention to the balance of power); (3) the im-
portance of survival of the state in what is an anarchical international
society;29 and (4) the importance of structure in terms of the relation-
ship among units of the international system (that is, the power dy-
namics). 30 This thinking is perhaps most closely identified with the
work of Kenneth Waltz. 31 Neoliberalism (sometimes referred to as
neoliberal institutionalism identified with Robert Keohane), also
takes the state as a primary actor.32 It views a state's pursuit of na-
tional self-interest in a market-oriented mode 3 3 as a dominant factor
in shaping international relations and in determining how successful
international institutions can be in directing and modifying interna-
tional behaviors.34 In this framework, the pursuit of absolute gains
(that is, both states are better off) is more important, and the pursuit
of relative gains (measured in comparison to other states' success) is
less so.
In the latter part of the 20th century a pluralist approach to interna-
tional relations theory emerged, encouraging examination of the role
of individuals, bureaucracies, and nongovernmental organizations in
28 See, e.g., James E. Dougherty & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of
International Relations 68-69 (5th ed. 2001).
29 Anarchy (the backdrop of the international world) places the burden of survival on
the state itself, which must use and maintain its power to survive. Thus, power is central
and achieving gains over other states is crucial in this survival mode. Id. at 35.
30 Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate 4-7 (1990) (defining realism).
31 See, e.g., Kenneth M. Waltz, The Theory of International Politics 102-28 (1979).
32 Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, note 28, at 68.
33 Stein, note 30, at 7-8 (describing neoliberalism as typically viewing regimes as a crea-
tion of states to overcome interstate "market failure").
34 Id. at 8 (against the backdrop of international anarchy, "order emerges as self-inter-
ested actors coexisting in an anarchic environment reach autonomous and independent
decisions that lead to mutually desirable cooperative outcomes").
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decisionmaking at the international level.35 Although the literature
frequently characterized neorealism and neoliberalism as in direct op-
position to each other, the work of the pluralists played a somewhat
different role. Rather than seek to completely supplant either of the
two main traditions, the pluralist approach contended that both ne-
orealism and neoliberalism failed to account for a major force in the
international relations dynamic when they ignored the role of non-
state actors. 36 The pluralists' work emphasized actors, relationships,
and other influential factors.37 Examples include research on cooper-
ation and integration in the European Union 38 and on geographic
environment.
39
A final, significant international relations strand, cognitivism, arises
from the postmodern international relations literature.40 The focus of
the cognitivist theories is less on developing paradigms for analysis
and more on critiquing the dominant models for the failure of interna-
tional relations to question the basis for knowledge. In particular,
cognitivists argue that states create their identities and determine their
interests based on beliefs held by state actors.41 Changes in knowl-
edge and belief systems can "trigger changes in policy," thus attention
35 See Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, note 28, at 28-34.
36 Nonstate actors include nonprofit organizations, experts, multinational corporations,
and trade organizations. See, e.g., id. at 28-29; Peter Willetts, Transnational Actors and
International Organizations in Global Politics, in The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations 356, 362-66, 369-81 (John Baylis & Steve Smith
eds., 2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Globalization of World Politics]. For example, in the field of
environmental regulation, nonstate actors can include scientists and scientific organiza-
tions, and local and international nonprofit organizations such as the World Wildlife
Federation.
37 Although the description of the relationships between and among neorealism, liber-
alism, and pluralism draws on widely shared positions, any effort to group international
relations theories according to the international relations meta vs. medium range scope
remains open to debate and is not universally agreed on. See, e.g., Dougherty & Pfaltz-
graff, note 28, at 17-18.
38 Id. at 519. This work is referred to as neo-functionalism and is associated with Ernst
Hass, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Philippe Schmitter, and Leon Lindberg.
39 See, e.g., Harold Sprout & Margaret Sprout, Geography and International Politics in
an Era of Revolutionary Change, 4 J. Conflict Resolution 145 (1960) (discussing the rela-
tionship between geography and international relations).
40 Postmodern is an umbrella term covering diverse theories such as critical theory, fem-
inism, constructivism, and post-structuralism. See Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, note 28, at 38-
40. Constructivism, itself a broad category intersecting with a variety of theories, assumes
"that our understanding of the world, and the intellectual tools used for viewing that world,
are not objectively derived but instead are the result of socially constructed concepts." Id.
at 166. Part of the process is "cognitive evolution" which explores how new ideas become
accepted-including the role of the epistemic community. Thus, the cognitivist strand fo-
cuses on information, ideas, and knowledge. Id. at 168.
41 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer & Volker Rittberger, Theories of International
Regimes 136 (1997).
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should be focused on how knowledge is distributed and how it shapes
the views of decisionmakers.
4 2
Neorealism, neoliberalism, pluralism, and cognitivism are the major
threads of the international relations landscape against which regime
theory developed. Each relies on a primary explanatory variable for
behavior and outcomes in the international context. The neorealists
contend that power (possessing, maintaining, or lacking) is the driving
force behind the decisions, behavior, and interactions seen on the
global stage. The neoliberal view (though not ignorant of power)
places much greater emphasis on the state's pursuit of its self-interest
in a world where information and monitoring costs often prevent
states from pursuing mutually desirable goals-"market failure" re-
quiring "intervention." The cognitivists treat knowledge and informa-
tion as critical to the shaping of international dynamics. Whoever has
information, knowledge, and ideas, and whoever determines what we
value and think, de facto determines much of the outcome. In fact,
pluralism is implicitly woven into some of the cognitivists' inquiries.
Certainly the reality of how international relations theory has
emerged over the decades is less neat, structured, and easily contained
than the above outline suggests. Comprehensive historical overviews
of international relations theory and its development struggle to pre-
sent a coherent yet accurate picture. That said, there are in fact two
important and clearly dominant traditions, and there have been two
valuable additions to the thinking of those traditions-one more of a
potential complement (pluralism) and the other a check and critique
(cognitivism). The value and importance of the ideas imbedded in all
of these international relations threads surface in regime theory.
Much work in regime theory synthesizes the neorealist and neoliberal
traditions, drawing upon their common features and shared assump-
tions (such as focus on states as central, rational actors and the reli-
ance on a rationalist mode of explanation that emphasizes material
factors, causal connections, and scientific inquiry).
43
2. International Regime Theory
International regime theory ("regime theory") is that part of the
international relations literature that seeks to answer the question of
42 Id.
43 For example, the works of Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little contribute
to this effort. See Barry Buzan, Charles Jones & Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy:
Neorealism to Structural Realism 36-38, 52, 82 (1993). A synthesis is plausible given the
common "core assumptions" shared by realism and liberalism. Stein, note 30, at 8; see text
accompanying notes 28-34.
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how and when countries reach agreement or how they cooperate. 44
"Regime theory [seeks] to explain the possibility, conditions, and con-
sequences of international governance beyond anarchy and short of
supranational government in a given issue area. '45 Although some
basic version of these questions always has been of interest to students
of political and international relations, attention to the idea of regimes
developed in the 1970's. 46 Several background factors prompted this
interest, including a recognition among U.S. scholars that the uniquely
powerful post World War II status of the United States had enabled it
to help create international regimes, and yet that power (at least in
economic terms) was diminishing. This apparent change in dominant
status generated questions about the prospects for future international
agreements and regimes.4 7 What began as a research agenda among
U.S. scholars transformed into a long-lived and more encompassing
inquiry joined by an increasingly diverse group of researchers.48
Regime theory is not a single theory in the sense of a single explan-
atory variable for the formation (or the content or effects) of regimes.
In fact, part of its appeal is its reliance on the major meta-theories
(neorealism and neoliberalism) in a way that intuitively seems plausi-
ble and enhances regime theory. Most scholars reject a single variable
approach to regimes.4 9 Instead, they urge the development of a cohe-
sive multivariate theory, with an expectation that the specific applica-
tion of regime theory and the reliability of certain predictive factors
will depend on the subject matter.50
a. Definition of Regime
What is a regime, or more precisely, an international regime? A
"consensus definition," drawn from the work of Stephen Krasner,51
44 Although most of the literature has a statist orientation, there is also emerging consid-
eration of international regimes among nonstate players (for example, members of an in-
dustry). See, e.g., Virginia Haufler, Crossing the Boundary Between Public and Private:
International Regimes and Non-State Actors, in Regime Theory and International Rela-
tions 95, 95, 101-09 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993) [hereinafter Regime Theory].
45 Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger & Michael ZOrn, Regime Theory: State of the Art
and Perspectives, in Regime Theory, note 44, at 391, 392-93.
46 See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Collective Goods and Future International Collabora-
tion, 66 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 874, 874-75 (1972).
47 Richard Little, International Regimes, in Globalization of World Politics, note 36, at
299, 300-02.
48 Volker Rittberger, Research on International Regimes in Germany: The Adaptive
Internationalization of an American Social Science Concept, in Regime Theory, note 44, at
3, 3-6.
49 See generally Mayer et al., note 45, at 413.
50 Id.
51 See Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 8-9.
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has formed the basis of much work in regime theory and served as a
central thread. 52 Krasner defines regimes as
[I]mplicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations con-
verge in a given area of international relations. Principles
are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are stan-
dards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.
Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.
Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for
making and implementing collective choice.5 3
A modification of the Krasner definition, which has gained wide
support (and in fact could be viewed as a clarification of an implicit
assumption) is the emphasis on effectiveness. 54 Thus, for example, a
regime would not exist where certain rules have been nominally
adopted by countries, but in practice are generally disregarded. Even
if true effectiveness is not required, it is anticipated that the rules of
the regime be "referred to in an affirmative manner by
governments." 55
A further interpretation of the "regime" definition contends that
"[o]nly where compliance is inconvenient-that is, where regime rules
conflict with governments' perceptions of what their self-interests
would be if there were no such institutions-is the impact of the re-
gime tested. '56 The strength of the inconvenience required should not
be overstated. For example, aviation standards requiring a common
air traffic controller language (adopted to facilitate international
travel and safety) result in many countries requiring airline/air traffic
52 Id. at 8; Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus of
International Lawyers, 14 Yale J. Int'l L. 335, 338 (1989); Haufler, note 44, at 96-97 (quot-
ing and working with the Krasner definition); Robert 0. Keohane, The Analysis of Inter-
national Regimes, in Regime Theory, note 44, at 23, 26-27 (quoting the Krasner definition);
Little, note 47, at 303; Volker Rittberger, Editor's Introduction, in Regime Theory, note 44,
at xii.
53 Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Inter-
vening Variables, in International Regimes 2 (S. Krasner ed., 1983). Krasner's definition
has been valued in part because its complexity encourages greater specificity in analysis of
regimes. See, e.g., Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 12-13. Another more simplified defini-
tion (which for these purposes is not in opposition to the Krasner definition) comes from
Robert Keohane: "Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by govern-
ments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations." Robert 0. Keo-
hane, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics, in International
Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory 1, 4 (Robert 0.
Keohane ed., 1989).
54 See, e.g., Keohane, note 52, at 27-28; Rittberger, note 48, at 9.
55 Keohane, note 52, at 28.
56 Id. at 33.
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controller personnel to speak a language other than the native lan-
guage of that state.57 Such a commitment may be inconvenient for the
participating country and thus conform to the regime concept, al-
though the inconvenience hardly rises to the level of, for example, an
interest in pursuing certain polluting or military activities. An impor-
tant element of the regime concept that emerges more explicitly from
Keohane's definition is that it pertains not to an entire field (for ex-
ample, defense or the environment) but to a narrower problem or
question on which some level of agreement has been reached. Agree-
ment may be achieved on certain aspects of a field but not others.
It may be useful at this stage to differentiate international regimes
from international institutions and international organizations. The
terms in some contexts can be used loosely and overlap; there are,
however, important distinctions. "International institutions," the
broadest category, are defined as "persistent and connected sets of
rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain
activity.... shape expectations .... [and] include formal intergovern-
mental or transnational organizations, international regimes, and con-
ventions. '5 8 International regimes, as defined above, are a subset of
international institutions, as are international organizations.5 9 The lat-
ter term refers to formal bodies such as the OECD or the World
Health Organization that can serve as an information builder, or can
do much more in the regime process.
b. Outline of Regime Theory
The focus of regime theory is to explore and better understand the
interactions captured under the concept of an "international regime."
The inquiry is divided into three basic questions: [1] "explaining the
formation, persistence, and demise of international regimes... ; [2] ac-
counting for regime properties and their change... ; and [3] determin-
ing regime consequences (or effects) and explaining their
variation .... 6o To date, the bulk of international relations research
57 See generally Kal Raustiala, Compliance,& Effectiveness in International Regulatory
Cooperation, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 387, 400 (2000).
58 Keohane, note 52, at 28.
59 Id. at 28-29 ("[Ilnternational organizations are purposive entities, with bureaucratic
structures and leadership, permitting them to respond to events. International regimes are
institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets
of issues in international relations.").
60 Mayer et al., note 45, at 406; see also Keohane, note 52, at 29, 31-33; Oran R. Young
& Gail Osherenko, Testing Theories of Regime Formation: Findings from a Large Collab-
orative Research Project, in Regime Theory, note 44, at 224-25.
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has tackled the first question;61 although the other two are exceed-
ingly important and likely to be interconnected (for example, different
types of regimes may generate different effects 62).
This Article utilizes the work of international relations theory on
regime formation-examining why cooperation is achieved on some
matters and not others. 63 The current regime theory literature can be
grouped into the following rough categories: (1) neorealist-based re-
gime theories, (2) neoliberalist-based regime theories, (3) cognitivist-
based regimes theories, and (4) a synthesis approach to regime theory
(which includes attention to nonstate actors as suggested by pluralist
theories in international relations). 64 These next Subsections briefly
review the four perspectives on regime theory and then consider how
they might be adapted for international tax.
i. Neorealist-Based Regime Theory
Theories of regime formation initially developed under the rubric of
"hegemonic stability theory. ' 65 The core elements of this theory con-
tend that: (1) states create regimes where their common interests in-
clude public goods because in such cases the states need cooperation
to further their interests; and (2) only the presence of an economic
and political power with the capacity and willingness to lead can make
the states who participate in the world economy a "privileged group"
61 See, e.g., Little, note 47, at 306-13; Thomas J. Biersteker, Constructing Historical
Counterfactuals to Assess the Consequences of International Regimes, in Regime Theory,
note 44, at 315-16 (noting that little scholarly attention has been directed to the effects of
regimes).
62 See Helmut Breitmeier & Klaus Dieter Wolf, Analyzing Regime Consequences, in
Regime Theory, note 44, at 345-47.
63 A regime must first be formed before it can be studied for its particular operation and
its effects. Given the dearth of international relations literature on international taxation,
formation seems a sensible starting point for examining the international tax system. It is
anticipated that future projects will consider the second and third questions of operation
and effects.
64 See, e.g., Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 1-6; Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 225, 248-
51.
65 Haufler, note 44, at 95. Hegemonic stability theory developed originally to explain
economic stability. Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 87-90; see Charles P. Kindleberger,
Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods,
and Free Rides, 25 Int'l Stud. Q. 242, 247 (1981) (explaining that the stability of the world
economy depends on some country acting as a stabilizer through world leadership) [herein-
after Dominance]; Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939, at 303-04
(Univ. of Cal. Press 1986) (1973) ("[Flor the world economy to be stabilized, there has to
be a stabilizer-one stabilizer."); see also Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stabil-
ity Theory, 39 Int'l Org. 579, 579 (1985) (hegemonic stability theory "claims that the pres-
ence of a single, strongly dominant actor in international politics leads to collectively
desirable outcomes for all states in the international system" (emphasis in original)). But
see Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 90 (noting that Kindleberger might not support the
broader extension of his hegemonic work to regimes).
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by supplying and supporting rulemaking and rule enforcement that
facilitates mutually beneficial exchanges. 66 As directed at regimes
specifically, hegemonic stability theory (HST) adopts the view that (1)
regimes are created and sustained by powerful actors (power deter-
mined in relation to the issue area at stake), and (2) that regimes
should "decline" when the founding hegemon declines and/or power
shifts. 67 The type of the "hegemon" in HST may vary-from a "be-
nevolent" 68 hegemon, which effectively bears all of the burdens sus-
taining the regime, to a forceful one, which uses its power to "coerce"
other states to contribute to sustaining the regime and "de facto
'tax[es]' them for the collective good provided under [the hegemon's]
leadership." 6
9
Central to the HST explanation is the assumption that regimes are
"public goods. '70 To the extent that regimes do not really constitute
public goods, the HST would be challenged. 7' What makes a regime a
public good? The question turns on whether a regime possesses "ex-
cludability"-if it does, the regime is not a public good.7 2 As to
whether in practice regimes possess "excludability," the answers are
expected to vary, although some key international areas (such as
trade) seem susceptible to excludability. 73 For example, if a state fails
to implement free trade policies as agreed, goods from that state could
face trade barriers abroad, even though other states' goods would still
enjoy the free trade regime.74 Such a trade regime could be said to
have the quality of excludability. Even a regime possessing exclud-
ability, however, can constitute a public good. If it is costly to impose
sanctions in the regime and the "benefits" of sanctioning rogue actors
are enjoyed by those not sharing in the cost of implementing sanc-
66 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 89 (summarizing Kindleberger on hegemonic stability
theory); see generally Kindleberger, Dominance, note 65, at 247-54.
67 See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International
Environmental Co-Operation, in Regime Theory, note 44, at 168, 181; Haufler, note 44, at
95. But see Snidal, note 65, at 612 (concluding that "there is no reason to expect that a
decline in hegemonic power will lead to the collapse of economic order").
68 See Snidal, note 65, at 585-90 (characterizing benevolent and coercive hegemons); see
also Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 90-91 (describing two variants in the theory of hege-
monic stability: the benevolent leadership model and the coercive leadership model),
69 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 91.
70 See, e.g., Snidal, note 65, at 580.
71 See, e.g., id. at 595 ("Insofar as collective action is likely, the theory of hegemonic
stability will be incorrect.").
72 See, e.g., id. at 592, 595-97 (exploring the concept of excludability in regimes).
73 See, e.g., id. at 596-97.
74 See, e.g., John A.C. Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the Interna-
tional Political Economy, 28 Int'l Stud. Q. 5, 8-11 (1984) (arguing free trade "does not
usually share either defining characteristic of a public good": nonexcludability and joint
supply).
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tions, then collective action/public goods problems exist. 75 In con-
trast, where a regime experiences no free-riding problems because the
regime benefit is not a public good, then a hegemon is not needed for
regime formation. Thus, the empirical question of whether regimes
exhibit excludability would be crucial to evaluating HST. If, as the
neoliberalists would argue,76 not all regimes involve public goods,
then the role for HST in evaluating regime formation may be lim-
ited.77 Moreover, even assuming that some regimes involve public
goods, it is possible under certain circumstances that a small subset of
states can exhibit the collective action necessary to form the regime
that provides broader public goods.78 That is, even with "public
goods" regimes, a hegemon is not always an essential component.
Therefore, a strong version of HST for regime creation and mainte-
nance is not theoretically mandated and seemingly contradicts some
empirical evidence. 79 Observations about the importance and signifi-
cance of a hegemon remain useful, however, in some cases. Further-
more, the declining impact of HST in regime analysis has not
eliminated power-based (neo-realist) examination of regimes. 80
Power-based theorists have identified other ways in which state power
critically shapes regimes.
The primary role of power in the HST view of regime formation
derives from the expectation that regimes require a "powerful" and
attentive player. 81 Another power-based, neorealist picture of re-
gimes espoused by Krasner and others, 82 has emerged in response to
75 See Joanne Gowa, Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An
Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?, 41 World Pol. 307, 314-16 (1989) (explaining
why excludability in free trade does not guarantee the absence of a public goods problem).
76 See Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 99 (noting neoliberal challenges to the public goods
claim).
77 See, e.g., id.
78 See, e.g., Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups 50 (1968); Russell Hardin, Collective Action 40-41 (1982) (analyzing the
potential for small sub-groups to provide a public good). Collective action by the subgroup
is more likely where a very small number of actors benefit from the mutual cooperation
(regardless of the overall size of the group that may benefit from the collective good). See,
e.g., Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 101; see also Snidal, note 65, at 598-612 (questioning
hegemonic stability theory because of the potential for a sub-group to do the hegemon's
job).
79 See Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 229 (rejecting pure hegemonic stability theory
for five case studies, but finding various power dynamics at work).
80 See Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes, in Regime The-
ory, note 44, at 49, 55 (noting the decline of hegemonic stability theory but the continuing
influence of power in the analysis).
81 Power is measured by reference to the issue area at stake.
82 I refer to Krasner because of his prominence in articulating this position, but others
have developed this line of thinking. See generally Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communi-
cations and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43 World Pol. 336 (1991) [herein-
after Global Communications]; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human
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the neoliberal work on regimes that followed the decline of HST. 83
The neoliberal story84 centers on market failure and argues that re-
gimes form because there is a market failure that prevents states from
reaching a Pareto-optimal outcome-and that the regime steps in to
reduce various transaction costs and to facilitate a Pareto optimal
result.
Krasner and other neorealists recognize that regimes can and will
be formed in the absence of a hegemon but contend that power re-
mains at the core of why a particular regime result is reached. 85 Ad-
vocates of this power-based position also agree that the international
cooperation witnessed in regime formation often can be characterized
as a response to market failure.86 Where then do these neorealists
part company with the "market failure" neoliberals? An important
area of dispute involves the type of game theory models used to re-
present the states' interactions. Krasner argues that the neoliberals'
market failure account typically uses a prisoner's dilemma game the-
ory model, which he claims generates misleading conclusions.87 In a
prisoner's dilemma game,88 there is a single Pareto optimal outcome
that can be achieved (with cooperation provided through the regime
mechanism). Little role for "power" differentials seems available in
this game. Krasner, though, disputes the prominence of the prisoner's
dilemma game, contending it is not the most plausible model for these
interactions among the states.8 9 Rather, he believes that other game
Rights, in Regime Theory, note 44, at 139, 139-40, 167 [hereinafter Sovereignty]; Geoffrey
Garrett, International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's
Internal Market, in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional
Form 365, 366 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993) (discussing "realist" regime theories).
83 See Mayer et al., note 45, at 406-07 (the "puzzle" created by the HST of regimes
prompted the neoliberalist work in the field).
84 See Subsection II.C.2.b.ii for a fuller discussion of neoliberal regime theory.
85 See, e.g., Krasner, Sovereignty, note 82, at 140 ("Regime creation and maintenance
are a function of the distribution of power and interests among states.").
86 See, e.g., Krasner, Global Communications, note 82, at 337 (where the distribution of
power is more or less symmetrical, regimes have been established to combat coordination
problems); Krasner, Sovereignty, note 82, at 140 (noting that "[s]ome prominent issues
[relating to regimes] can clearly be characterized as market failure problems ... ").
87 Krasner, Global Communications, note 82, at 336 ("Regime analyses based on market
failure inevitably obscure issues of power because, given a Pareto suboptimal situation and
a concern with absolute not just relative gains, it is possible to make at least one actor
better off without making others worse off-an outcome that can be resolved [without]
resort to power. ... ). In many cases, however, there may be "many points along the
Pareto frontier: the nature of institutional arrangements is better explained by the distri-
bution of national power capabilities than by efforts to solve problems of market failure."
Id. at 337.
88 See text accompanying notes 125-27.
89 Krasner, Global Communications, note 82, at 342.
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models90 (particularly "battle of the sexes"/coordination games) are
prevalent, and in these games there is more than one Pareto-optimal
outcome and the truly critical question is why one outcome prevails
over the other.91 This is a question of power-a conflict over which of
two (or more) Pareto-optimal results will be selected. 92 Krasner does
not claim that the neoliberals are oblivious to the power (and distribu-
tional) dimensions of their market failure theory, but rather that they
give them inadequate attention.93 In fact, Krasner identifies three
ways in which power is used to shape and influence "the games" the
neoliberals describe:94 (1) states use power to decide who can join the
game (less powerful players face exclusion or the threat of exclusion);
(2) states use power to set the rules of the game, such as which player
can "move" first; (3) states use power to change the "payoff matrix"
(that is, to change the other state's order of preference for out-
comes)-a powerful state may link different issues (military, eco-
nomic, and others) such that only a single resulting "outcome
package" is Pareto efficient, and it is an outcome desired by the power
state. More generally, powerful states may have less vested in a par-
ticular game-and can more credibly argue that they will walk away,
thereby forcing the other party to choose the outcome favored by the
powerful state (that is, among Pareto outcomes, the one more
favorable to the powerful state). 95 For example, in free trade discus-
sions, larger states typically have more power than smaller ones be-
cause they have less invested in that particular outcome-thus the
larger states can threaten to change the game or not play, in order to
achieve particular goals (economic or noneconomic).
96
In addition to disputing the neoliberal depiction of which games are
being played by states and how they are played, neorealism maintains
that its view of anarchy is more complex and impacts regime forma-
90 The game models for states' interactions are described at text accompanying notes
125-33.
91 Krasner, Global Communications, note 82, at 342-43 (for international communica-
tions issues, power, not market failure, was the defining issue, and the question was which
Pareto-optimal result would prevail); see also Krasner, Sovereignty, note 82, at 140 (noting
that market failure questions may not represent the full scope of international politics).
92 See, e.g., Krasner, Global Communications, note 82, at 342-43 (noting that power
matters in determining "which point along the [Pareto] frontier [will] be chosen").
93 See id. at 361-62 (market-failure based research, though aware of power issues, essen-
tially ignores them).
94 Id. at 340.
95 See id. at 340; Stephen Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade,
28 World Pol. 317, 320 (1976); Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of
Foreign Trade 13-34 (1945) (describing use of power in foreign trade).
96 Krasner, note 95, at 320.
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tion. Under the neorealist view, the anarchic world97 in which all
states exist is not defined merely by the absence of a single enforcer
(as, for example, might be provided in a federal system). 98 It also is
defined by the fact that states must continually fight for their sur-
vival.99 Equipped with a survival mentality, a state might reject a re-
gime that coordinates action and generates gains for all players if that
regime allows another state to achieve relative gains.100 In this view,
the Pareto efficiency story is incomplete in capturing the goals and
options facing states. Although states are utility maximizers in both
the neorealist and the neoliberal view, the neorealists view a state's
utility as impacted by how other states are faring.10' The significance
of this factor in assessing the likely success of a regime turns on how
much weight states place on relative gains in practice. The answer
may vary depending on the number of parties and the balance be-
tween relative and absolute gains. 102
In this power-based story, what is the role for the regime? Neoreal-
ists typically view regimes as playing a less significant role in explain-
ing and shaping cooperative outcomes 10 3 compared to the vision held
by neoliberals. Regimes do serve to coordinate action and "establish
stability, ' 10 4 and, in addition, even these power-based theories hold
97 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and
Strategies, 38 World Pol. 1, 1 (1985) ("Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central
authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests.").
98 See, e.g., Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Cri-
tique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 Int'l Org. 485, 497-98 (1988). Grieco
chooses not to distinguish between realism and neorealism "because on crucial issues-the
meaning of international anarchy, its effects on the states, and the problem of coopera-
tion-modern realists ... are very much in accord with classical realists .... " Id. at 485 n.1.
99 See Waltz, note 31, at 102; see also Duncan Snidal, International Cooperation Among
Relative Gains Maximizers, 35 Int'l Stud. Q. 387, 389 (1991) ("[States] must attend to their
security ... in order to be around in the longer term.").
100 See Snidal, note 99, at 387-89.
101 Joseph M. Grieco, Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation:
Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model, 50 J. Pol. 600, 608-13 (1988) (mod-
eling a state's utility as a function of the relative payoffs to the state and its partners, and
describing six factors that influence a state's sensitivity to these relative payoffs) [hereinaf-
ter Realist Theory]; See also Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe,
America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade 44-46 (1990) [hereinafter Cooperation]; Hasen-
clever et al., note 41, at 119; Hurrell, note 80, at 58.
102 See, e.g., Grieco, Cooperation, note 101, at 45-46 (discussing a range of factors in-
cluding the state's long-term relations with the other state (ally or not), the degree of the
existing power imbalance between the states, and the specific topic area in which the re-
gime operates (that is, economic well-being or security)); Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains
and the Pattern of International Cooperation, 85 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 701, 706, 708-13
(1991).
103 See, e.g., Grieco, note 98, at 485.
104 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 107 (quoting Krasner, Global Communications, note
82, at 337); see also Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications
for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 923, 937 (1985).
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that regimes can generate their own power. Krasner offers the exam-
ple of the telecommunications regime that allocates the electromag-
netic spectrum as a case of weak states using the structure of
membership and voting in the relevant organization (the International
Telecommunications Union), combined with their technical ability to
disrupt powerful states' broadcasts, to obtain a better outcome than
their power outside of the regime would have permitted. 10 5 The issue
of allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum, is considered a "classic
coordination problem" because unless states agree on use of the spec-
trum, multiple broadcasts will interfere with each other.106 For exam-
ple, particularly desirable slots (the geosynchronous ones) located
above equatorial states were highly contested, with some less power-
ful equatorial states arguing for control of the slots above their
space. 10 7 These allocation issues ultimately were addressed through
the conferences organized by the International Telecommunication
Union in which states are central actors because they are the key par-
ties to enforcing agreements on broadcasting activities within their
borders. 10 8 Less powerful states could press their position to some
degree given the one state, one vote structure. Although the outcome
still favors more industrialized (powerful) countries because most fre-
quencies are allocated on a first-come, first-serve basis, the prefer-
ences of less powerful states were not completely ignored given their
voting role (and the possibility that they could interfere with other
states' broadcasts).
10 9
Moreover, although neorealists consider regimes less effective 110
and less robust' than do neoliberals, there are nevertheless certain
105 Krasner, Global Communications, note 82, at 351-53; see also R. Bender, Launching
and Operating Satellites: Legal Issues 42-56 (1998) (reviewing the history, process, and
tensions among states in the allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum and the operation
of the International Telecommunications Union).
The behavior of states can be viewed as a measure of the power created in regimes: "If
regimes did not have significant (distributional) consequences, actors would not bargain
hard to determine their content and the 'battle' would not so often continue to be fought
even after the establishment of an institution." Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 108.
106 Krasner, Global Communications, note 82, at 351.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 352-53. The less industrialized countries argued that first-come, first served
allocation (that is, allocation based on present need) favored the more industrialized coun-
tries who could demonstrate use of the spectrum now. Thus, the less industrialized coun-
tries sought to reserve at least a portion of the spectrum for future need. Id.
110 Effectiveness is measured as the degree to which the regime achieves its intended
purposes. Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer & Volker Rittberger, Interests, Power,
Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes, 40 Mershon Int'l Stud. Rev. 177, 178, 217
(1996).
11M Robustness captures the likelihood of the regime surviving the decline of the power
players or changes in external conditions. Id.
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ways in which the neorealist vision of regimes is broader than that of
the neoliberals. 112 It is generally agreed that regimes can remedy cer-
tain problems plaguing cooperation (for example, compliance and
cheating related issues), but the neorealists see other barriers to coop-
eration that regimes can resolve. 113 For example, an international re-
gime might include provisions that reduce the size of the gap in
benefits accruing to different participants (that is, minimize the rela-
tive gain problem). These provisions can take the form of special
rules that apply to the weaker states that otherwise would benefit less
from the regime. 14 Similarly, regimes can enable the provision of
side payments to enhance the position of states dissatisfied with their
relative situation. 15 Neorealists also have argued that states may join
a regime with a more powerful state because the regime structure may
provide the weaker states a better platform for challenging (or at least
voicing their concerns and views) about the power state in the rele-
vant issues area.116
Whether the neorealist story is a better reflection of some or most
regimes turns in part of what types of games are regularly "played" by
cooperating states, and how much importance states place on relative
gains. Continued empirical research and case studies may illuminate
these questions. It is perhaps most plausible that different types of
games and thus different types of regimes exist, granting neither vision
an exclusive theoretical claim.117
ii. Neoliberalist-Based Regimes Theories
The majority of regime theory analyses have developed under the
umbrella of neoliberalism. A driving theme of the neoliberal tradition
maintains that states are "instrumentally rational actors" 118 pursuing
112 See Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 122-23; Grieco, Cooperation, note 101, at 233-34.
113 A strong statement of this position would be that because the neoliberals do not see
all of the barriers to cooperation, they do not see all of the functions that regimes can and
do perform to enable cooperation.
114 Grieco, Realist Theory, note 101, at 614-20; Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 123.
115 Grieco, Realist Theory, note 101, at 619-20; Grieco, Cooperation, note 101, at 234;
Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 123.
116 Grieco, Realist Theory, note 101, at 620 (citing Hirschman, note 95). Grieco has
characterized France and Italy's decision to join with the fiscally powerful Germany in
moving towards a European monetary union as an effort on the part of France and Italy to
use the new institution (that is, the European Currency Bank) to secure a forum and op-
portunity to raise their concerns and views about EU monetary policy against the more
dominant Germany. See Joseph M. Grieco, The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Mone-
tary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme, 21 Rev. Int'l Stud. 21, 34-39 (1995);
see also Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 123-24.
117 Hasenclever et al., note 110, at 217-21 (considering possible interactions between
realism and neoliberalism); see text accompanying notes 167-73.
118 Hurrell, note 80, at 55-56.
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self interest and reciprocal benefits.1 19 Essentially, "the basic chal-
lenge for states is to overcome market failure.... [and] [i]nternational
regimes,... are a device for overcoming market failure. 1 20 Market
failure here describes a situation in which states may not reach their
optimal outcome, an agreement, because of problems in the market
structure (for example, information or monitoring). If the states can
act cooperatively, they may achieve outcomes superior to the subop-
timal outcomes of their individual uncoordinated behavior. This co-
operation can be obtained through the formation of a regime that
offers a number of solutions to the market failure, including overcom-
ing the assurance problem, reducing transactions costs, and facilitating
information exchange.1
21
Within this neoliberalist framework, regime research has pursued
three major lines of inquiry, each targeting different factors in a re-
gime formation: (1) the bargaining game involved, 22 (2) the issue at
stake,1 23 and (3) the background system. 124
Bargaining Games The interactions among countries (and other ac-
tors) in the international arena can be viewed through the lens of
game theory. For example, the prisoner's dilemma scenario 125 illus-
trates the role of regimes in solving a "market failure" by providing a
"collaborative outcome." In a prisoner's dilemma case, the parties
will "defect," even though that result is inefficient, because that out-
come is the only equilibrium in the absence of "collaboration."' 126
119 Id. This liberal strand often has been labeled "neoliberal institutionalism." In this
Article, the neoliberal position generally is identified by that term, although occasionally
reference to particular authors draws upon the functionalism or institutionalism language).
120 Krasner, Sovereignty, note 82, at 139.
121 See, e.g., Keohane, note 52, at 35; Hurrell, note 80, at 57; Friedrich Kratochwil, Con-
tract and Regimes, in Regime Theory, note 44, at 73, 80.
122 See text accompanying notes 125-33; Stein, note 30, at 27-38 (describing coordination
games, dilemma games, and games of common aversion and the likelihood of success in
each).
123 See notes 134-45.
124 The background system refers to both the impact of secondary variables (such as
frequency of interaction among the parties) and the institutional bargaining involved. See
text accompanying notes 146-51; see also Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, note 28, at 106-08, 111;
Manfred Efinger, Peter Mayer & Gudrun Schwarzer, Integrating and Contextualizing Hy-
potheses, in Regime Theory, note 44, at 252, 260-66; Keohane, note 52, at 35. The exis-
tence of institutional structures and agreement in the general policy area may facilitate
agreement on a new issue to the extent that the current structures rely on relevant and
widely shared norms and can ease communication and reduce costs. See, e.g., Efinger et
al., supra, at 260-66; Keohane, note 52, at 35. In addition, the presence of a strong leader
can be critical to regime formation. See Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 230 (noting the
studies' indication of the consistent importance of the role of individual leaders).
125 See, e.g., Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 30-31 & n.7 (describing classic prisoner's
dilemma).
126 "Collaboration" and "coordination" are both distinct forms of cooperation-that is,
acting "together in order to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome." Little, note 47, at
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Stated in the language of the prisoner model, it makes sense to confess
if you fear the other prisoner also will confess and implicate you. The
creation of a regime facilitates the collaboration and information shar-
ing necessary to overcome the parties' fear of being cheated. Extin-
guishing the fear of being cheated may be achieved through: (1) a
monitoring function, (2) the implications of an iterative game,(3) the
risk of tit-for-tat behavior, and (4) reputational concerns. 127
Of course there are an array of other strategic games (coordina-
tion,128 suasion,' 29 assurance 130 ) with different properties, such as
more than one Pareto efficient equilibrium (for example, coordination
games such as air traffic controller language), or alternatively, a single
equilibrium where only one party is happy but the loser is still better
off because defection is worse (suasion game). Depending on the type
of strategic game characterizing the issue area, regime formation may
be more or less likely. A hierarchy of probability for regime forma-
tion among strategic games has been articulated with suasion games
314. Coordination, as seen in the air traffic controller example above, describes coopera-
tion "to pursue a common strategy in order to avoid the mutually undesirable outcome
arising from the pursuit of divergent strategies." Id. Collaboration describes the coopera-
tion in resolving a scenario such as a prisoner's dilemma, where the goal is to prevent
defection "from a mutually desirable strategy [to] an individually preferable strategy." Id.
127 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 34-35.
128 A coordination game differs from the prisoner's dilemma collaboration version in
that there is no risk of defection once some agreement has been reached. Close monitor-
ing to ensure compliance is not necessary as it may be in prisoner's dilemma case (where a
lone defector receives zero prison time instead of a light sentence). For example, recall the
air traffic controller situation. A single language for air traffic communication is necessary,
and selection of a single language is the best outcome for all parties. Once that language is
selected, no one has an incentive to defect, nor does one really fear defection on the other
side (in contrast to the prisoner's dilemma that required monitoring or enforcement of the
agreement). In a coordination context, the agreement is "self-enforcing." Id. at 48.
129 The central idea in a suasion game is that one of the two parties has a primary strat-
egy to cooperate (the "cooperation version") or alternatively to defect (the "defection"
version). In the cooperation version of the suasion game, the dominant strategy for party
A is to cooperate. Thus regardless of whether party B decides to cooperate or defect, A
will cooperate. As a result, B has to be persuaded to cooperate because for B the best
outcome is A cooperates and B defects, and this can be achieved automatically because A's
dominant strategy is to cooperate. Essentially, A has two choices: (1) threaten to act irra-
tionally (that is, threaten to defect even though that is against A's best interest), or (2)
offer something extra to B if B cooperates on this matter. It can be difficult, though not
impossible, for A to persuade B that it will act against its own interests. However, it is
possible to offer B something else for cooperation. Thus, we might expect to see a suasion
game on one issue linked with another suasion game between the parties. Id. at 51-52.
130 The classic example of an assurance game is the stag hunt in which two hunters plan
to go hunting for a stag. In order to hunt the stag they must work together; if either hunter
wanders off to catch a rabbit, that hunter will gain a rabbit, but no stag will be caught.
Thus, both hunters prefer to cooperate and hunt the stag. Mutual defection is also an
equilibrium, however, because if one hunter defects, then the other should as well (both
obtain rabbits). The worst outcome is if one hunter defects and the other hunter continues
hunting for the stag alone. Id. at 49-50.
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being the most difficult in which to form a regime because the regime
must not only address monitoring and sanctioning, but also distribu-
tion of goods (because the parties do not share the same dominant
strategy). Prisoner's dilemma scenarios may be more capable of gen-
erating cooperation because distribution is not a major issue (the pris-
oners' Pareto optimal outcome of mutual silence imposes the same
burdens on both parties) although monitoring and sanctioning needs
are still present (recall that each prisoner needs to be certain that the
other prisoner is not confessing). Coordination games are arguably
easier still because only distribution must be addressed by the regime
(for example, picking the "winning" air traffic controller language).
131
Once the selection (for example, of a language) is made, no country
has an incentive to defect from that choice. Finally, assurance games
are the most likely to experience success because the required coordi-
nation poses none (or very little) of the three problems identified
above (monitoring, sanctioning, and distribution). 132 In the assurance
game, both parties share the same preference (joint cooperation), so a
regime is needed only to assure each other that they have rationally
reviewed the situation and recognize their mutually preferred
outcome. 1
33
Issues The issue area itself'34 also constitutes an important explana-
tory factor for regime creation. Three major policy domains dominate
international life: security, system of rule, and economic well-be-
ing.' 35 Security issues, quite obviously, concern physical protection
131 Other examples of coordination include "standardization of measurement systems,
standardization of equipment within NATO, or recent European attempts to adopt com-
mon standards in telecommunications equipment .... Snidal, note 104, at 932.
132 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 54. In contrast, in the prisoner dilemma scenario, each
prisoner would prefer the outcome in which he defected (confessed) and the co-conspira-
tor cooperated (remained silent) because the defector would be freed while the cooperator
served a heavy sentence.
133 See Lisa L. Martin, Interests, Power, and Multilateralism, 46 Int'l Org. 765, 769
(1992) ("In 'assurance games,' institutions [such as regimes] have little to contribute to
cooperation under conditions of complete information. However, given the structural un-
certainty of international relations, states may find some ... institutionalization .... con-
ducive to ... achiev[ing] mutual gains."); see generally Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under
the Security Dilemma, 30 World Pol. 167 (1978) (considering historical security situations
from the perspective of an assurance game in which both parties prefer a particular out-
come but for various reasons of uncertainty may be worried that the other state will not act
consistent with their mutually desired goal).
134 "Issue areas" have been defined as "one or more, in the perception of the actors
inseparably connected objects of contention and of the behaviour directed to them." Man-
fred Efinger & Michael Zorn, Explaining Conflict Management in East-West Relations: A
Quantitative Test of Problem-Structural Typologies, in International Regimes in East-West
Politics 64, 68 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1990).
135 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 62 (quoting and translating Ernst-Otto Czempiel, In-
ternational Politik: Ein Konfliktmodell 198 (1981)).
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from internal and external threats. 136 System of rule issues are those
regarding how states allocate "opportunities for exercising freedom
and for political participation .. among individuals. ' 137 And finally,
issues of economic well-being address how economic gains are shared
and how the "opportunities for achieving such gains" are allocated. 138
The predictive conclusion is that if an issue belongs to the economic
category, where there is "divisible 'gain' rather than indivisible
4power'... at stake," then regime formation is more likely than for
security or system of rule issues.139 As between security and rule is-
sues, security is considered more conducive to regime formation.
140
In addition to this basic categorization of issues by subject area,
conflicts (or issues) can be grouped based on the nature of the conflict
itself. Conflicts break down into four categories: (1) "conflicts about
means"-states share the same goal but disagree on how best to
achieve it; (2) "conflicts about values"-states "hold incompatible
principled beliefs regarding the legitimacy of a given action or prac-
tice; ' 141 (3) conflicts of interest over relatively assessed goods-states
value the same scarce resource, in this case goods whose value to the
state depends on how much of the good the state has relative to other
states (for example, weapons); and (4) conflicts of interest over abso-
lutely assessed goods-states value the same scarce resource, in this
case goods whose value to the state is independent of the amount of
the good possessed by other states (for example, food items). 142
The first two classes of conflicts are "dissensual" (that is the states
disagree about what is "desirable"). 143 The second two classes are
consensual: There is agreement as to what is desirable and that agree-
ment generates the conflict because the good is subject to competition
(weapons or food, in the above examples). 144 Regime theory work
contends that conflicts over absolutely assessed goods (for example,
food) are most conducive to regime formation, followed by conflicts
over means, then conflicts over relatively assessed goods, and finally
conflicts over values (for example, human rights). 145 This ordering by
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 62-63 (citing Czempiel, note 135). Note that a classic example of a "rule" issue
is human rights. See, e.g., Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 63.
140 Id. at 63.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 63-64.
143 Id. at 63; see also Beth A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, International Organizations
and Institutions, in Handbook of International Relations 192, 196 (Walter Carlsnaes,
Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002).
144 Simmons & Martin, note 143, at 196; Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 63-64.
145 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 64 fig.6.
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conflict type from most conducive to least conducive (absolutely as-
sessed goods, means, relatively assessed goods, values), corresponds
to the ordering identified above by issue type (economic, security,
rules). Why is this the case? Economic conflicts are likely to be con-
flicts over absolutely assessed goods; security conflicts are likely to be
conflicts over relatively assessed goods; and rule conflicts are likely to
be conflicts over values. The remaining conflict type, "conflict over
means," is the second most likely to produce agreement. Because a
conflict over means reflects disagreement about form, not substance,
one would expect to see such conflicts arise in all three issue types.
Background System Features of the background system against
which the specific international conflict occurs impact the likelihood
of agreement and regime formation. Two primary background fea-
tures are: (1) the set of "secondary variables" that characterize the
parties and the situation; and (2) institutional elements that frame the
mindset of a negotiating country. The secondary variables can be
readily enumerated and the potential influence on interaction be-
tween and among states is obvious, even if the specific outcome is not.
These variables include: (1) "frequency of interaction," (2) type of for-
eign policy practiced by the states, (3) "the distribution of issue-spe-
cific resources,... (4) the presence or absence of salient solutions,...
(5) the number of actors in the issue-area,"1 46 and (6) strong individ-
ual leadership (relying on "negotiation skill and ingenuity (rather than
power)"). 147 The effect of each factor may vary depending on the
strategic game under consideration. 48 For example, distribution of
the relevant resources among states "makes a difference for coordina-
tion, collaboration and suasion situations, but hardly so for assurance
situations."1
49
The "institutional bargaining" factors are elements inclined to affect
the state's general perspective on the agreement process. Two key
elements are likely to promote bargaining: (1) uncertainty-states' un-
certainty about possible strategies and outcomes and about how those
outcomes relate to the states' "core" interests leads states to "engage
in integrative (rather than distributive) bargaining;"'150 and (2) exoge-
nous shocks-the existence of an exogenous shock (for example, dis-
146 Id. at 54-55; see also Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 231.
147 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 76 (analyzing Oran Young's model of leadership).
148 Id. at 55.
149 Id. Recall that in an assurance game, both parties prefer "mutual cooperation" as
their first choice and defection as a second choice (with no advantage to a state that defects
while the other cooperates). In such games, the distribution of resources is not important.
If both states have "full" information, they will cooperate.
150 Id. at 72; see also Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 231.
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covery of the ozone hole over the Antarctic) is expected to increase
states' efforts to create a regime. 51
In sum, neoliberal regime theories view regimes as forming in re-
sponse to market failures in the interactions among states. Market
failure itself though is insufficient to ensure the creation of a regime.
Three core factors influence whether a regime will in fact emerge: (1)
the bargaining game involved, (2) the issue itself, and, (3) the back-
ground system. Evaluating the bargaining game, issue, and back-
ground system of a particular international conflict may indicate the
likelihood of regime formation and may reveal the greatest hurdles.
Despite the distinctions between neorealist and neoliberal theories
reviewed here, the two are strongly connected as rationalist theo-
ries152 and in fact are potentially quite complementary in their views
of regimes. 153 Both share a number of common assumptions, includ-
ing: (1) states function against a backdrop that is anarchical; (2) states
are rational (and, at least to some degree, unitary actors); (3) coopera-
tion in the international environment is the source of regimes; and (4)
regimes "promote international order."'1 54 These common features
are the subject of critiques from the major remaining strand of inter-
national relations theory on the study of regimes, cognitivism.
iii. Cognitivist-Based Regimes Theories
Cognitive theory stands separate from the first two strands of re-
gime theory. Cognitive scholars as a group have provided the primary
challenge to the rationalist theories, "criticiz[ing] realists and utilitari-
ans [i.e. neoliberals] for not taking into account the pervasive ambigu-
ity of reality and consequently emphasiz[ing] factors such as
perception, knowledge, and ideology. ' 155 In fact, the theory is
predominantly a critical one, not directed at establishing an affirma-
tive vision of regime formation. Cognitivist theory in the regime area
has divided into two strands, a "weak" version and a "strong" ver-
151 Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 234-35; Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 75; see gener-
ally Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance 6
(1998) (describing the role of new ozone information in redefining the problem under
negotiation).
152 Mayer et al., note 45, at 409; Hurrell, note 80, at 56.
153 Keohane, note 52, at 30.
154 Little, note 47, at 301.
155 Mayer et al., note 45, at 409.
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sion," although only the former contributes to regime theory.
156
Under the weak version, "the demand for regimes in international re-
lations depends on actors' perception of international problems, which
is, in part, produced by their causal and normative beliefs." 157 Thus,
the weak version draws attention to the question "what are the 'ori-
gins and dynamics of rational actors' understanding of the world?"
158
The analysis of regimes from the weak cognitivist viewpoint starts
with three assumptions: (1) states' interests are contingent on their
understanding of the world because these interests are not a given; (2)
due to the technical nature of many international issues and the uncer-
tainty that states experience in trying to assess what options best
achieve their interests, states are increasingly relying on experts and
scientists to provide information and advice (and such reliance affords
the experts an opportunity to influence state action); and (3) some
degree of intersubjectively shared meaning about the subject at issue
is required before regime formation is possible; that is, the states must
have some shared vision of the problem and its context in order to
achieve some level of cooperation.
1 59
One particularly interesting development from the work is attention
to the role of learning and "epistemic communities." Because of the
weak cognitivists' first assumption (a state's interests are not a given),
policymakers turn to experts as described in the second assumption, to
help them formulate the state's interests. In some cases, these experts
as a group may be able to shape the direction of policy and, through
widespread dissemination of particular knowledge, facilitate broad
156 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 137. Note that the terminology of "weak" and
"strong" refers to the strictness and exclusiveness of the theory's focus on knowledge, not
to the quality of the arguments.
The strong cognitivists reject at the outset the rationalists' view of states as calculating
goal maximizers, and offer an alternative view of states as "role-players." Hasenclever et
al., note 41, at 155. Some strong cognitivists also reject the underlying methodology of the
rationalists: positivism and reliance on "objective knowledge" and the "formulation and
empirical testing of causal hypotheses." Id. at 220 (citing Keohane, note 52, at 24-26). This
Article, while cognizant of the limits of a positivist methodology, concludes that rationalist
approaches combined with weak cognitivism can provide a more relevant and instructive
model of international tax relations. Thus, Parts III and IV analyze the international tax
system using those approaches, both individually and as part of a more integrated
approach.
157 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 137.
158 Id.
159 The cognitivists' focus on this last point does not make it exclusively their domain.
Presumably neorealists and neoliberalists anticipate that countries must have some mea-
sure of agreement on what the issue is in order to work through a resolution. The distinc-
tion is that the cognitivists are particularly focused on why we know what we know. If
information shapes states' goals and conduct, what is the origin of the information? What
kind of power and influence accords to those who possess, frame, and disseminate
information?
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agreement and ultimately regime formation. Such a group of experts
is defined as an "epistemic community" ("network[s] of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that do-
main or issue-area"). 160 Epistemic communities facilitate regime for-
mation by first developing some consensus among themselves on an
issue (for example, ozone). Second, the epistemic community, which
exists across the relevant states, exerts influence to shape, direct, and
change state views on the issue. This new knowledge and learning can
cause the states to redefine their conception of their national inter-
est.161 To the extent the epistemic community has been successful dis-
seminating its information and causing decisionmakers to adopt its
views, the "widely shared ideas may facilitate cooperation in the ab-
sence of a unique equilibrium, [and serve] as focal points which help
define acceptable solutions to collective action problems.1 62 Thus,
weak cognitivism proposes a model of how states may come to adopt
new positions and how purveyors of knowledge can under certain cir-
cumstances shape the direction of new policy. Despite the major role
of cognitivists as skeptics and critics, cognitive theories frequently are
understood (even by advocates) as being "complementary" to realism
and neoliberalism. 63
iv. Synthesizing the Regime Theory Literature
In order to use international relations theory as a tool to understand
and ultimately improve international taxation, the first step is to de-
termine how to envision the relationship of the various international
relations theories. Are they purely competitive models requiring the
user to test and select the most appropriate one? Are they compatible
and capable of integration into a larger theoretical approach? Al-
though much of the international relations regime theory work has
been strongly competitive, with scholars pursuing their own individual
directions, there have been efforts to synthesize the international rela-
tions literature. With respect to coordination of neorealism and ne-
oliberalism one could ask "whether market failure or distributional
issues best describe the range of issues involving international polit-
160 Peter Haas, Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, 46 Int'l Org.
1, 3 (1992).
161 See generally Haas, note 67, at 168-201.
162 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 144.
163 See, e.g., Christer J6nsson, Cognitive Factors in Explaining Regime Dynamics, in
Regime Theory, note 44, at 203. This move has been interpreted as not just a vote for
complementarity, but a recognition of the "priority ([but] not the superiority) of rationalis-
tic approaches .... Mayer et al., note 45, at 410 (assessing J6nsson's position on the place
of cognitive theory in the regime agenda).
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iCS. ''164 As an example, Krasner argues that "human rights regimes...
do not address political market failure problems and therefore cannot
be adequately understood from the perspective of liberal co-operation
theory ... [that is, neoliberal regime theory]."'1 65 He applies his posi-
tion to four case studies of human rights and concludes that "success
and failure were not a function of the regime's ability to reduce uncer-
tainty and to supply information for its members but rather of the
willingness of the most powerful states to enforce its principles and
norms (which these states themselves had promoted) [that is, neoreal-
ist regime theory]."'1 66 Whether one views international tax conflicts
as the result of market failure (for example, uncertainty, information
needs, and transaction costs) or not, may have direct bearing on the
applicability of neorealist vs. neoliberal regime theories. It is certainly
plausible, however, that different international tax issues could be
classified in different ways. Even if market failure plays no role in any
human rights regimes, such uniformity may not be evident in all other
subject matter areas.
If regimes develop for different reasons, then the different theories
may each be valid and informative for some subset of cases.1 67 Haas
enumerates four basic regime patterns: 168
(1) Neorealist "follow-the-leader" pattern: "The regime is created
by the strongest party and other countries are compelled by the domi-
nant country to join and comply" (although the regime itself may be
weak or strong depending on the underlying goals of the powerful
state). 1 6
9
(2) Institutionalism (neoliberalism) and bargaining: Regimes are
created through bargaining structures reflecting each state's individual
cost-benefit analysis and drawing upon game theory propositions (the
more participants, the more difficult to reach agreement; moreover,
the rule or position adopted by the regime often represents the lowest
common denominator of the participants (although not always)). 170
(3) Epistemic communities and follow-the leader: Regime creation
reflects the cognitivists claim about uncertainty in the international
tax system-if states' interests are unclear and epistemic communities
164 Krasner, Sovereignty, note 82, at 140.
165 Mayer et al., note 45, at 408.
166 Id.
167 Observe the influence of pluralism ideas in the synthesis described in the text. Not
only does a more sophisticated neoliberalism recognize the role of "secondary" variables
(including leadership), the weak cognitivists' attention to epistemic communities provides
another way to understand the impact of certain professional groups and international or-
ganizations with an expertise.
168 Haas, note 67, at 180-90.
169 Id. at 181.
170 Id. at 183.
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have "consolidated influence in the dominant state, then [the] follow-
the-leader [model] may be modified" to acknowledge the epistemic
consensus and role in the hegemon.
171
(4) Epistemically informed bargaining: A regime can be created
with the assistance of a widespread epistemic community, even in the
absence of a strong state; for example, "[e]nvironmental regimes in
this instance emerge through institutional bargaining, as described by
institutionalists.'1
72
These four patterns represent a power-based model (realism), an
interest-based model (liberalism), a modified power-based model
where information or knowledge (cognitivist thread) impacts the exer-
tion of power, and a modified interest-based model where the institu-
tional bargaining pursued by the states is significantly impacted by
information or knowledge transmitted by epistemic communities. 173
III. INTERNATIONAl. TAX CASE STUDY IN REGIME THEORY
A. Some Initial Issues
This Part undertakes the evaluation of the international tax case
study using international regime theory. The purpose is to assess re-
gime theory as an explanatory model.
Before undertaking this task, it is valuable to confront an obvious
reality of this project. Any effort to import international relations
learning into international tax requires a certain measure of effort on
the part of the tax analyst. The international relations structure, ter-
minology, perspective, and tools must be absorbed and understood
before they can be applied to tax. Can we be sure that this investment
is worth the effort? Several factors strongly argue yes. First, in envi-
ronmental law, the application of regime theory analysis to a series of
case studies has generated interesting preliminary analysis about ele-
ments that are regularly present in cases of successful regime forma-
'71 Id. at 187. Essentially, the epistemic community in the hegemonic state is helping
that state to formulate and identify its interests, which as "hegemon" it will then pursue.
172 Id. at 188. In this pattern, there are no relevant "hegemons," and the states do not
have a clear sense of their interests. If an epistemic community spreads across the states
and reaches a degree of consensus on some issue, such as the pollution problem in a certain
region, then the epistemic community may be able to mobilize in each of the affected states
to inform decisionmakers (and the public) and galvanize their action.
173 Although many of the case studies completed by international relations theorists to
date tend to favor interest-based theories as explaining regime formation, there remain
gaps in that theory, notably in its failure to account fully for struggles marked by power
and distributive concerns. See, e.g., Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 230-31; Hasenclever
et al., note 41, at 4, 7.
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tion and those that are absent. 174 Second, the effort to carefully parse
the factors influencing international relations should lead us to evalu-
ate them more precisely in the international tax context, even in the
absence of a full scale international relations regime theory analysis.
Without question, improving our understanding of how we do and do
not reach agreement on international tax does matter. Third, use of
an independent field of study to enhance tax policy and practice is not
new. Over the past several decades, in both domestic and interna-
tional tax, economic analysis and economic models have been central
in shaping discussion, targeting concerns, and framing possible op-
tions.175 These efforts to use economics are not costless-tax scholars
must devote substantial resources to absorbing the literature. Even
though the resulting tax conclusions typically rely on stylized models
and highly simplified assumptions, there seems to be a consensus that
the effort to integrate economic analysis into the development of tax
law and policy has been, on balance, fruitful.
Clarification of tax terminology is also crucial to the case study.
Frequently tax practitioners, scholars, and government officials speak
of the "international tax system" or "international tax regime," by
which they have in mind a wide assortment of common rules and
problems, as well as interactions among nations. For purposes of ex-
ploring the ability to reach agreement on particular rules in the inter-
national tax arena, however, such a broad use of the term "regime" is
not effective. Some features of the system constitute a regime but
others do not. Describing the entire effort as a "regime" would be
174 For more than 15 years, environmental researchers and scholars have been studying
regime formation and regime effectiveness. See, e.g., The Effectiveness of International
Regimes: Casual Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms 1-2 (Oran Young ed., 1999).
One large multinational collaborative project conducted five in-depth case studies in envi-
ronmental regime formation. The project involved fourteen researchers from four coun-
tries. See generally Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 224. The project sought to ascertain
the determinant factors in success (or failure) or regime formation. The five case studies
were tested for the persuasiveness of four basic explanatory hypotheses (power-based, in-
terest-based, knowledge-based, and contextual analysis), both broadly and in more detail.
Interesting and potentially valuable observations emerged from this serious study. For ex-
ample, the study suggested that knowledge-based factors can play a role in early regime
formation but are less significant as the terms of the regime are more concretely negoti-
ated. Id. at 236. "Leadership" of individuals (in particular, structural, entrepreneurial, and
intellectual leadership) played a notable role in all of the environmental case studies and
was thought to be a "necessary condition" for the regime formation. This environmental
research identifies a plausible role for such research to play in the development and growth
of the substantive subject area. For additional analysis of environmental regime formation,
see Young, note 151. Other research projects, including those examining why regimes vary
in effectiveness, also demonstrate possible roles for regime study. See, e.g., id.
175 For example, in the debates surrounding domestic tax arbitrage, economic analysis
has been used to flesh out the impact of potential tax rules under different scenarios. See
Ring, note 8, at 106-09 (describing the difference between "normal" and "pure"
arbitrage).
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both inaccurate and would miss much of the detailed operations in the
international tax world. Just as in the environmental area one would
not speak (in international relations terms) of a single regime, but
rather of regimes on different initiatives (for example, the Mediterra-
nean Action Plan-targeting the poor water quality of the Mediterra-
nean),17 6 so too in the tax context it is necessary to focus more clearly
on particular problems or initiatives.
B. Application of International Relations Theory to the Avoidance
of Double Taxation Regime
1. The Regime
The selected case study targets what is often characterized as the
heart of the international tax system-agreements to relieve double
taxation (that is, income tax treaties). Although these agreements
might be tempting primary candidates for regime designation and
analysis, it is valuable to look behind the specific bilateral treaties to
the network of bilateral treaties, model treaties, and domestic law, all
of which reflect a shared understanding of double taxation and its re-
lief.177 Arguably a regime exists at this level, at least as measured by
the consensus definition of regime: "the principles, norms, rules, and
decision making procedures" that prescribe state behavior in an issue-
area.178 Thus, in this case, the principle is that international double
income taxation is harmful and should be avoided. The norm is that
residence countries should yield primary tax jurisdiction to source, at
least with respect to certain types of income. The rules include the
details of the particular mechanisms by which the residence jurisdic-
176 Haas, note 67, at 191-93.
177 The problem of double taxation refers to the possibility that two different states
might tax the same income of a given taxpayer. For example, if a U.S. corporation earns
money providing services in France, both countries could plausibly seek to tax that income.
Such an outcome generally has been perceived as undesirable because, particularly at
higher tax rates, such an uncoordinated tax burden could eliminate all profit from the
transactions. Relief from double taxation does not require agreement (bilateral or multi-
lateral). A country can unilaterally provide this relief by offering a credit for foreign taxes
paid (or alternatively by excluding income earned in another country from taxation). In
fact, shortly after the U.S. income tax was enacted in 1913, the United States adopted a
foreign tax credit (FFC), allowing U.S. taxpayers a credit against their U.S. income taxes
for foreign taxes paid on foreign income. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 222(a)(1),
238(a), 240(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073, 1080-82 (1919). Given this unilateral relief opportunity,
actually utilized by a major economic player, what more was needed? Why was a regime
needed? As noted, certain issues required for the proper functioning of FTC depended on
the cooperation of (and adoption of appropriate rules by) the corresponding source sover-
eign. Thus, unilateral action sought bilateral long-term support. See text accompanying
notes 191-193, 258-59.
178 Krasner, note 53, at 2.
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tion yields to the source jurisdiction (either through granting an FTC
for the income taxed by the other country, or through the exemption
of foreign source income). The procedures include the process of bi-
lateral specification through a negotiated treaty with reciprocal rights
and obligations and the opportunity for review through the competent
authority mechanism.179 Although the details of many individual trea-
ties vary, their content is remarkably constant, down to the order and
numbering of the actual articles. This uniformity holds not only for
the major model treaties (OECD, U.N., and U.S.18°), but also for the
network of bilateral treaties. How did this regime emerge? What
were its origins? These questions must be answered before examining
the double taxation issue through the regime theory lens.
2. The History of the Double Taxation Regime
The current avoidance of double taxation regime has its origins in
the 1928 League of Nations draft model bilateral income tax treaty
and the documents preceding it (including the work of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce ("ICC").181 The central challenge, as
clearly understood by the participants, was how to resolve the compet-
ing claims of the source and residence jurisdictions to tax the income
from cross border transactions.1 82 On a theoretical level, two compet-
ing tax norms existed, supporting the two sets of claims. Residence
jurisdiction could be preferred on the grounds that: (1) It best reflects
ability to pay (because the taxing state can "readily" base its taxation
on the entirety of the taxpayer's income and thus have an accurate
sense of the taxpayer's fiscal picture). (2) Income "belongs" to people
(residence), not places (source). (3) People are less mobile than activ-
ities. (4) The source approach would put tremendous pressure on the
definition of source. 18 3 Alternatively, source jurisdiction could be pre-
ferred: (1) The source country provides the infrastructure permitting
the creation of the income (the benefits principle). (2) The source
country may be aware of the income's existence and hence better able
to capture the tax. (3) The source country can tax it.184
179 The treaty provisions specify how states, through designated representatives, will
evaluate and review problems under the treaty.
180 See notes 214, 219, and 227.
181 See generally Graetz & O'Hear, note 14.
182 See id.
183 See, e.g., id. at 1034. In fact, in addition to resolving the source/residence conflict in
taxation, treaties serve a crucial function in resolving source/source disputes. The "source"
of income is not always obvious; thus any system that relies heavily on source designations
places great pressure on the source rules.
184 See, e.g., id. at 1037-38 (Thomas S. Adams, a major U.S. tax advisor at the time of the
framing of the international agreement on double taxation, expressed the view that source-
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Since, any state concerned that its residents might face double taxa-
tion could either implement an FTC or exempt foreign source income
from residence country taxation,18 5 why would a country take this
move unilaterally, which, for example, effectively allocates the first
right to tax the foreign income of U.S. taxpayers to the source coun-
try? 18 6 Three important reasons supported the decision: 18 7 (1) It en-
couraged foreign investment (that is, U.S. investment into Europe),
which was desirable post-World War I when U.S. private investment
was viewed as essential to the rebuilding of Europe and thus to Eu-
rope's ability to pay its war debts.'88 (2) It encouraged U.S. exports
by increasing European access to dollars.18 9 (3) Tax rates during and
just after World War I were high enough to turn double taxation from
a nuisance into a serious issue.
After the U.S. implementation of an FTC several other countries
followed although not on the same scale (nor through the same mech-
anism), including Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and France-all by
based taxation was inevitable because the revenue was "there" and it was unlikely that
source countries could be convinced otherwise). This view has been repeated frequently.
See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, "What's Source Got
to Do With it?" Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 Tax L. Rev. 81, 89
(2002) (noting claims that "force majeure" has driven source taxation as much as any
moral argument).
185 If a country prevents double taxation of its residents through exemption of foreign
source income, it is possible that the income will bear little or no income tax. For example,
even if the source jurisdiction taxes the income item at a low or zero tax rate, the income
would not be taxed in the residence country under the exemption system.
186 Edward Seligman, the influential U.S. economist who oversaw the League of Na-
tions' 1924 report on international taxation, viewed enactment of the FTC as "the United
States . . . making a present of the revenue to other countries." Edwin R.A. Seligman,
Double Taxation and International Fiscal Cooperation 133-34 n.10 (1928), quoted in
Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1046. The decision to provide relief from double taxation
through the FTC rather than an exemption, seems to have been driven in part by the views
of Adams, the proponent of the U.S. FTC in 1918. Adams saw residence countries as a
valuable backstop in the taxation of income. If income escaped taxation in the source
jurisdiction, it could still be taxed in the residence country under a credit approach. Graetz
& O'Hear, note 14, at 1038-39; see note 185.
187 Adams expressed the view to the League of Nations during the inter-nation treaty
process that "[e]ach State should be eager, for selfish and economic reasons, to relieve its
own nationals and residents from that measure of double taxation which is due to its own
legislation." Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1051 (quoting T.S. Adams).
188 See id. at 1049, 1052-53.
189 See id. at 1050 (quoting Mitchell Carroll in 1927: "The American [foreign tax] credit
system is ideal for a wealthy nation that desires to encourage the expansion of its foreign
trade, and is willing to afford relief from double taxation to its own citizens or residents
.... The United States says, in effect, to its citizens-go abroad and trade ... and I will
give you relief."). In addition, where the F[G facilitated cross-border investment, it en-
couraged economies of scale of production, which would mean more efficient production
for the home market. Id. at 1051.
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1928.190 Despite states' ability to provide unilateral relief through a
credit (or an exemption), there was significant and widespread inter-
est in developing a treaty approach for resolving many of the issues
not so readily subsumed under the FTC.191 Important questions in-
cluded: (1) how to determine the source of particular income; (2) how
to balance the concerns and desires of creditor and debtor nations,
especially with respect to rules governing interest and dividend taxa-
tion (After World War I the United States and the United Kingdom
were major creditor nations and the continental European countries
were debtor nations.); 192 (3) what should be the limits on a state's
ability to tax the business enterprise of another state (the permanent
establishment question); and (4) how to mesh the details and mechan-
ics of two states' domestic systems that begin with different tax bases
and different levies.1
93
The ICC, which was formed in 1920,194 directed early attention to
double taxation. In 1920, the ICC adopted a resolution seeking
''prompt agreement between the Governments of the Allied countries
in order to prevent individuals or companies from being compelled to
pay a tax on the same income in more than one country. '' 195 The ICC
presented resolutions (not in treaty form) regarding double taxation
at its 1923 Rome Conference. 196 The resolutions included features
that remain today (classification of income by category for taxation
and allocation of business income among the source nations to which
it corresponds). 197 Ultimately, the resolutions were not adopted,
largely due to British opposition derived from a strong preference for
residence-based taxation and their view that the resolutions granted
too much taxation to the source countries.
198
For a capital exporter, the British position is not surprising. Per-
haps what is more interesting is that the United States, also a capital
exporter in 1923, generally supported the substance of these resolu-
tions. The U.S. position seems explained in part by: the views of Ad-
ams, the major (and influential) U.S. representative to the ICC, who
190 See Mitchell B. Carroll, Double Taxation Relief, Discussion of Conventions Drafted
at the International Conference of Experts, 1927 and Other Measures 2 (Dep't of Com-
merce Trade Information Bull. No. 523, 1928).
191 See generally Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1082-85; cf. note 215.
192 See, e.g., Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1087.
193 Several famous early treaties preceded the Models including the 1922 Treaty of
Rome (ratified by Austria and Italy) and the 1926 U.K.-Irish Free State Treaty. See Car-
roll, note 190, at 5.
194 Seligman, note 186, at 114.
195 Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1066 (quoting the ICC); see also Seligman, note 186, at
114.
196 Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1069.
197 Id. at 1069-70.
198 Id. at 1071-72.
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historically had advocated for source-based taxation. 199 Adams was
interested in reaching international agreement on the details of
double taxation, which required the support of debtor states. 200 An-
other factor was "the international balance of payments, which was
overwhelmingly in the United States' favor and which permitted (per-
haps even, in the interests of providing dollars for the purchase of U.S.
exports and for the payment of U.S.-held debt, required) generosity in
source rules to capital importers.
'201
As the ICC undertook its work in the early 1920's, the League of
Nations issued its famous 1923 Report on Double Taxation by the
"four economists" representing the United States, the United King-
dom, Italy, and the Netherlands. 20 2 The Report adopted a decidedly
more pro-residence approach than the ICC by allocating interest and
dividends to the residence (that is, lender) country, and by failing to
call for residence countries to provide an FTC.20 3 In fact, the struc-
ture of their recommended scheme mirrored their view that the
double taxation question was not one of sharing and allocating taxing
rights between residence and source countries. Rather, they under-
stand the question as an exclusive choice-either residence or source
jurisdiction for income. The 1923 Report divided taxes into those on
global income (taxed only at residence) and all other taxes (taxed at
residence or source depending on an "economic allegiance" principle
that in practice favored residence).
20 4
As its 1923 Report was being drafted, the League of Nations sepa-
rately appointed a Committee of Technical Experts to translate the
concerns over double taxation into more precise, practical and con-
crete suggestions. 205 The Technical Experts issued their preliminary
199 Id. at 1072.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Report on Double Taxation, Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors
Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Joseph Stamp, League of Nations Doc. No. E.F.S.
73.F.19 (1923), reprinted in 4 Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Legislative History of United
States Tax Conventions 4003 (1962) [hereinafter Legislative History].
203 Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1077-78. The work of the "four economists" was sub-
stantially led by Seligman, a U.S. tax scholar of significant influence in the United States,
but with a decidedly pro-residence stance, in contrast to Adams. See, e.g., W.H. Coates,
League of Nations Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee By
Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, 87 J. Royal Stat. Soc. 99, 102
(1924) (citing the four economists' long-term hope that countries will come to the option of
allocating the whole tax to residence (with an exemption system) as the most desirable
resolution of the double taxation issue).
204 Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1077; see Carroll, note 190, at 5-6.
205 Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1080.
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Report in 1925.206 In contrast to the 1923 League Report by the four
economists, this 1925 Report reflected a stronger pro-source stance2
07
("a majority of the drafters of the 1925 Report came from debtor na-
tions"208) and was endorsed by the ICC. The next step for the League
was to draft an actual model bilateral treaty. In preparation for this
assignment, the Technical Experts committee sought to broaden its
drafting body.20 9 The United States came on board as one of the few
creditor nations, motivated in part to protect its interests as such, to
ensure a model that would integrate well with the U.S. system (which
did not use the more schedular approach of many European coun-
tries), to encourage global uniform rules (to facilitate U.S. investment
and trade), and to promote a multilateral treaty.210 The Technical Ex-
perts worked for several years, eventually producing the model treaty
(actually three models reflecting different combinations of states with
either unitary or mixed tax systems) in 1928.211 The resulting alloca-
tion of income was described as one in which "neither the country of
origin nor the country of residence makes a complete sacrifice in favor
of the other. '212
The next major contribution to the double taxation project came
from the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
("OEEC"), established in 1948 (predecessor to the OECD) as part of
the U.S./Canadian aid distribution under the Marshall plan. 213 From
1958-61 the OEEC Fiscal Committee undertook the task of develop-
ing a model treaty214 because of the "increasing importance of [the
uncertainty in existing treaties as an] impediment to international
206 Report Presented by the Comm. of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax
Evasion, League of Nations Doc. F.212 (1925), reprinted in Legislative History, note 202,
at 4049.
207 See, e.g., Seligman, note 186, at 179-82 (Appendix: Extracts from Double Taxation &
Tax Evasion Report and Resolutions Submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial
Committee of the League of Nations, Feb. 7, 1925). For example, the 1925 Report granted
certain categories of taxes to the residence or source country exclusively. Graetz &
O'Hear, note 14, at 1080.
208 The seven original representatives came from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France,
Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland. See Carroll, note 190, at 5-6.
209 These later representatives came from Argentina, Germany, Japan, Poland, and Ven-
ezuela. T.S. Adams joined the group for the United States in 1927. See id.
210 See, e.g., Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1082.
211 Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxa-
tion and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562 M.178 1928 11 (1928), reprinted in
Legislative History, note 202, at 4151, 4159-60; see also Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1082-
86.
212 Carroll, note 190, at 17.
213 See OECD, History of OECD: Organisation for European Economic Co-operation,
http.//www.oecd.org/document48/O,2340,en_2649_201185_1876912_1_1-1_1,00.html [here-
inafter OECD History].
214 See, e.g., United Nations, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Be-
tween Developed and Developing Countries, 2001 at xviii [hereinafter U.N. Model Treaty].
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commercial transactions. ' 215 The OEEC released four reports be-
tween 1958-1961, including draft treaty provisions and commentary.2 16
In 1961, the OECD superseded the OEEC and took over its Fiscal
Committee and the treaty project.217 In 1963, the OECD issued its
model tax convention and commentary, which limited the source
country's ability to collect tax on investment income.218 Subsequently
revised Model Treaties were released in 1977 and 2000 (with updates
in the interim and thereafter). 219
Developing countries 220 dissatisfied with the pro-residence orienta-
tion of the OECD Model Treaty prompted the United Nations (which
had replaced the League of Nations in 1945)221 to enter the realm of
model tax treaty drafting. The U.N.'s Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries tackled
the problem of drafting a model treaty to promote investment into the
developing country and protect tax revenue.222 The Ad Hoc Group
produced its first report in 1969, which reflected the OECD Model
Treaty as its starting point. In 1980, the first model treaty was re-
leased. 223 Although it favored source jurisdiction more than the
OECD Model Treaty, it still reflected a compromise in that it granted
neither source nor residence countries exclusive jurisdiction to tax. 22 4
A more recent draft model treaty was released in 2001.225
The last major player to enter the drafting universe (although it
produced a draft before the United Nations) was the United States-
with its 1976 Model Treaty.226 (Subsequent models appeared in 1977,
1981, 1996, and 2006.)227 Differences exist between the U.S. and
215 Adrian A. Kragen, Double Income Taxation Treaties: The O.E.C.D. Draft, 52 Calif.
L. Rev. 306, 307 (1964).
216 See OEEC, Fourth Report of the Fiscal Committee on the Elimination of Double
Taxation, Annexes A-E (1961), reprinted in Legislative History, note 202, at 4619, 4643-51.
217 OECD History, note 213.
218 OECD, Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (1963).
219 OECD, Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital (1977);
OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Apr. 29, 2000; OECD Model
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, July 15, 2005 [hereinafter OECD Model
Treaty].
220 Generally developing countries are capital importers, and thus are more frequently
the source country in a transaction than the residence country.
221 See History of the United Nations, at www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory (updated 2005).
222 See, e.g., U.N. Model Treaty, note 214, at viii.
223 Id. at x-xi.
224 Id. at xiii-xiv.
225 See U.N. Model Treaty, note 214.
226 United States Model Convention on Income and Capital, May 18, 1976, reprinted in
10 Walter H. Diamond & Dorothy B. Diamond, International Tax Treaties of All Nations,
417.
227 Treasury Dep't Model Income Tax Treaty of May 17, 1977, reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties
(CCH) $ 212; Treasury Dep't, Model Income Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981, reprinted in 1
Tax Treaties (CCH) 211; United States Model Income Tax Convention of Sept. 20, 1996,
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OECD Model Treaties, reflecting special concerns of the United
States, such as the treatment of citizens and the prevention of treaty
shopping. Yet once again the similarity between treaty models is dra-
matic, revealing shared views on the nature of the problem, the struc-
ture of its solution, and much of the content of the solution.
3. Regime Theory Application
Accepting the assertion at the beginning of Part III that there is
indeed a regime governing the issue of double taxation, and that the
regime comprises the above-described activities, agreements, and doc-
uments, is it possible to understand how it formed and to contemplate
when regimes will be successful in the international tax environment?
To the extent that regime theory accurately describes this case study,
it begins to define the contours of regimes in international tax. Of
course additional steps (outlined in Part IV) will be needed to develop
confidence in the regime view of international tax.228
The first step is to discern whether the double tax regime seems
driven by power (neorealist tradition) or whether it seems to re-
present a case of market failure (neoliberal tradition)-that is,
whether the resulting regime is a product of the exercise of power by
one state, or a product of several states overcoming informational bar-
riers to reach mutually desirable outcomes. Then, one must analyze
the case within the framework of either the neorealist or neoliberalist
theory with attention to the knowledge-based questions generated by
the weak cognitivists, where applicable.
a. Neorealist Regime Theory-Power and Distribution
An initial reaction may be that any problem involving tax is inher-
ently distributional229 because the rules are de facto allocating the
rights to tax revenue to one country over another. If countries have
approximately equal investment flows, however, then tax rules that
are uniform (that is, reciprocal) ultimately should provide the same
net amount of tax revenue to each country. At the very time that the
reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) T 210; United States Model Income Tax Convention of
Nov. 15, 2006 reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) T 209.
228 For example, one would need to review a wide array of cases, including those in
which regimes failed to be established. Also, one would need to apply the regime theory
model to cases currently in progress and attempt to predict the likely course of events. But
this process begins here with the first case study.
229 It is important to note that in this context the term "distributional" has no equity or
fairness connotation. Instead it captures the distribution of "power" with respect to a par-
ticular topic. Thus, the distribution of relevant resources matters to the extent it impacts a
state's power.
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first model treaties were being drafted, the collected nations were in
fact not equals but rather represented a set of creditor and a set of
debtor nations. In such cases, the anticipated alignment of interests
would be that debtor nations (capital importers) would prefer a
source-based rule structure and creditor nations (capital exporters)
would prefer a residence-based one. This dynamic was mirrored in
the clash between the United Kingdom (which favored a residence
rule) and the drafters of the 1923 ICC Report (which "favored"
source-based taxation). To the extent the double taxation/source issue
is perceived as a distributional one, one might anticipate that the more
powerful countries would prevail-by pushing for rules that favor
their type of country (capital importer or capital exporter). Given
that creditor nations (capital exporters) typically would be cast as the
more "powerful" set of nations, one would expect the double taxation
rules to favor residence jurisdictions. In contrast, the actual outcome,
as explored below, suggests a degree of complexity not fully ac-
counted for by a model based on power-both because of the detailed
source/residence allocation rules produced and because the two major
powers and capital exporters, the United States and the United King-
dom, did not take the same expected position (favoring residence).
Recall that the United States and several other countries imple-
mented a unilateral FTC (in whole or in part), which favored the
source jurisdiction, whereas the views espoused in the 1920's by the
United Kingdom supported taxing most cross-border income at resi-
dence.230 Presumably the original U.S. unilateral FTC provisions
were enacted based on the assessment (voiced by T.S. Adams 231) that
a country benefited more by facilitating its own residents' cross-bor-
der business activity, than by collecting the taxes. Why? The answer
reflects the temporal and economic dimensions of tax rules. On the
temporal side, if no FTC is available this year, the residence country
can obtain extra tax revenue, but in the future cross-border activity
will be discouraged with negative consequences for the revenue base
and the economy of the residence country. A country must measure
its success by more than its current tax revenue;232 economic growth is
also valued. If tax rules discourage taxpayers from engaging in other-
wise desirable cross-border transactions, there may be a significant
230 See, e.g., Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1072-73.
231 See note 186.
232 Or certainly more than its immediate revenue. If the residence country's multina-
tionals do business overseas, and the residence country allows an FTC, it still may get some
tax revenue this year from those transactions, and it will continue (at least in theory) to see
that flow. Also, the residence country will benefit from its industrial economy of scale
(better goods at home too), and likely capture wages from producing companies' employ-
ees based in the residence country.
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drag on the residence economy and revenue. Thus, the divide be-
tween debtor and creditor nations in terms of their preferred tax rules
was not as great as might have been anticipated. Although continen-
tal Europe was in debt, it had leverage (as explained by Adams)
against creditor nations such as the United States because: (1) the
United States wanted repayment (as opposed to offering debt forgive-
ness); (2) Europe was a viable and needed market for U.S. exports;
(3) agreement on the details of double taxation233 presumably would
facilitate cross-border trade; and (4) the debtor nations were well rep-
resented in the ICC and their support was needed for agreement upon
any model treaty. The United States may have been powerful in eco-
nomic terms, but with respect to double taxation, European partners
(and their role in a continuing and growing U.S. economy) were im-
portant actors as well.
Why did the United Kingdom not share the U.S. perspective on the
source/residence debate? Certainly the U.K.'s position was consistent
with the initial expectations for a capital exporting nation-but what
about the additional factors bearing on the U.S. thinking? The precise
foundation for U.K. advocacy of residence taxation (beyond the basic
observation that it tends to favor capital importers) is not clear, but
two possibilities emerge. First, the residence position was the existing
Commonwealth approach and the United Kingdom may have resisted
any deviation. Second, the United Kingdom, while a creditor nation,
may not have been as strongly involved as the United States in the
commercial side of rebuilding Europe after World War I.
Thus, although there is a distributional aspect to the resolution of
double taxation, particularly in the case of countries with unequal in-
vestment flows, it is not entirely clear that the distributional issues are
as significant as the potential market failure problem described in the
next Subsection.234 That is, power does not seem to fully account for
how the ultimate agreement was reached and how the regime on
double taxation was formed. Why is power not enough? Note that
some countries (more powerful) took the unilateral step of enacting
an FTC (which limited their revenue) before negotiating the remain-
der of the double taxation details with other states.235 This decision
233 Such as the provision of uniform source or allocation rules.
234 The double taxation issue can be envisioned as an effort to make the revenue pie
bigger for countries by encouraging cross-border transactions (and perhaps discouraging
evasion of especially burdensome taxes).
235 One could argue, however, that unilateral adoption of the FTC is evidence neither of
power nor of market failure as the root of the double taxation agreement. If a certain
practice is beneficial enough that it should be implemented, even if only unilaterally, then
the fact that the regime was developed in two stages does not eliminate the power explana-
tion. In this case though, the credit approach adopted unilaterally and promoted globally
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 60 Tax L. Rev. 125 2006-2007
TAX LAW REVIEW
was interesting because it both went counter to presumptions about
the general interests of capital exporting states, and because it indi-
cated that some dimensions of the double taxation problem could be
resolved without agreement or a regime. But in the end even these
states sought multilateral agreement on double taxation because, in
part, of the potential harm from clashes between states taking differ-
ent positions on the residence/source country debate and from differ-
ences in source rules.236 In fact, given that the United States and
much of post-war Europe favored the claim of the source countries,
one might question the need for a regime. But the additional imple-
mentation details mattered as well as the general ideas-and a closer
look at those details demonstrates that they were resolved to ensure
neither the source nor residence country yielded all and that certain
tradeoffs made by a state would be guaranteed.237 Thus, although the
model treaties offered by the United Nations, the OEEC, and the
OECD tended to favor the residence country in its various source and
allocation rules,238 the baseline idea of eliminating double taxation
through an FTC (or exemption) favored the source jurisdiction.
Over time, other countries have entered the dialogue concerning
the allocation of taxing rights between residence and source. Many of
them are non-European countries that are in a distinctly different me-
dium- to long-term economic posture vis a vis traditional capital ex-
porters such as the United States, or even vis a vis the capital
importers of the 1920's, many of which were countries recovering
from World War 1.239 Some of these new entrants to the debate
balked at the OECD's pro-residence 240 formulation of its model
by the United States favored debtor/source nations and thus fails to resonate as a power
move in regime formation.
236 If country A claims residence taxation prevails and country B claims source taxation
prevails, and both agree the income was earned in country B, then double taxation is possi-
ble. Also, even if country A and country B agree that source taxation has priority, double
taxation is possible if the two countries disagree as to where the income is "sourced."
237 See Carroll, note 190, at 17.
238 For example, treaties source particular classes of income based on the residence of
the taxpayer. See, e.g., OECD Model Treaty, note 219, art. 11 (interest income sourced to
the residence country, which is permitted to tax it; the source country may also tax the
income, but at a capped withholding rate). Also, a source country (country B) is permitted
to tax the activities of a residence country (country A) taxpayer taking place in country B,
only if the activities rise to a certain threshold-that is, constitute a "permanent establish-
ment." See, e.g., id., art. 5 (permanent establishment defined), art. 7 (taxation of the per-
manent establishment's business profits).
239 See, e.g., U.N. Model Treaty, note 214, at viii (listing countries involved in the U.N.'s
treaty drafting process, including Argentina, Brazil, Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Republic
of Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela).
240 At first it may seem contradictory to suggest that the behavior of the United States,
or other countries that enacted an FTC, was "favorable" to source jurisdictions, while also
noting that source/capital importing countries were displeased with the OECD Model
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treaty provisions, a characterization that even the OECD accepted. 241
As the countries had no direct mechanism for influencing the OECD's
model treaty because of the "limited" nature of the OECD member-
ship, they ultimately worked through the UN to produce a draft more
sensitive to the position of developing, that is, source, countries.
242
This historical development leads to two observations regarding the
neorealist understanding of regime formation. 243 First, consistent with
the neorealist view of what functions a regime can perform, 244 the
double taxation regime and its reliance on model treaties drafted by
Treaty. In fact, both are true. Unilateral implementation of an FTC by a residence/capital
exporter country does seem to go against that country's initial interest in tax revenue max-
imization. The OECD Model Treaty, however, (as well as the other model treaties) en-
compasses more than the implementation of a credit (or exemption) method by the
residence country. That can be accomplished unilaterally. What requires more negotiation
and drives the desire for a treaty are the complicated questions. It is in the details that the
OECD treaty was viewed as favoring the residence countries over the source countries.
241 [T]he traditional tax conventions have not commended themselves to developing
countries, [because] the essential fact remains that tax conventions which capital-ex-
porting countries have found to be of value to improve trade and investment among
themselves and which might contribute in like ways to closer economic relations be-
tween developing and capital-exporting countries are not making sufficient contribu-
tions to that end . . . Existing treaties between industrialized countries sometimes
require the country of residence to give up revenue. More often, however, it is the
country of source which gives up revenue. Such a pattern may not be equally appro-
priate in treaties between developing and industrialized countries because the income
flows are largely from developing to industrialized countries and the revenue sacrifice
would be one sided.
U.N. Model Treaty, note 214, at vii (quoting the OECD).
242 Developing countries, in theory, could have started afresh on the issue of double
taxation, rather than rely on the existing double taxation treaty framework. Such an ap-
proach would have entailed a number of costs, including developing the alternative struc-
ture, and the loss of familiarity, certainty, and predictability of the longstanding
framework. Tax treaties appeal to developing countries for a number of reasons, chief
among them the comfort that they provide to the new investor. Treaties facilitate the inter-
section of two countries' tax system and provide a framework for resolving conflict. Trea-
ties also can signal to investors that a country is part of the "international" system and one
can be comfortable pursuing business and investments there. Many emerging market
countries believe that a treaty is an important indicator to potential investors about the
status and reliability of the nation-that is, a country needs to have a treaty to be perceived
as a plausible and viable investment destination. See, e.g., Lee Sheppard & Juliann
Avakian Martin, Part II: Departing U.S. Treasury Staffer Discusses Treaties, 15 Tax Notes
Int'l 949, 950 (Sept. 22, 1997) (quoting Deputy Intl. Tax Counsel Daniel Berman).
243 Recall, neorealists view power as the dominant explanatory factor for the existence
of regimes, and more specifically, for the form the regimes take. Neorealists expect states
to be concerned about their relative gains-thus a mutually "beneficial" regime could be
rejected by a state because it accorded another state relative gains. Additionally, neoreal-
ists generally view regimes as weaker than neoliberals do, although they see some func-
tions for regimes in coordinating action (for example, the powerful state may use the
regime to more smoothly produce its desired outcome). Neorealists even acknowledge
that regimes can provide power to the weaker players.
244 But this is also not inconsistent with the neoliberalist perspective considered in the
next Subsection.
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different international bodies, allowed the weaker states (for example,
post-World War II developing countries) to voice their views on treaty
structure.245 The implication is that participation inside the regime
with the potential for some influence is preferential to sitting outside
the regime entirely. Along these lines, it is interesting to note that the
UN used the OECD Model Treaty as its starting point. Not only were
these developing countries working within the double taxation regime,
they were really working "inside" by accepting the pre-existing struc-
ture for resolving the issues.
246
Second, contrary to the neorealist view that regimes reflect and fur-
ther the powerful state's goals, the double taxation regime exists sepa-
rate from and independent of the continued participation of many
developing and emerging market countries-many "comparably" posi-
tioned states seek agreement with each other on the matters of double
taxation. In that sense, the regime at its core is not about a major
power struggle in resolving double taxation. Developed countries
with relatively comparable flows seek agreement because it enables
coordination on details that otherwise could impede the smooth oper-
ation of unilateral efforts to prevent double taxation (for example,
through credit or exemption). That said, to the extent the basic model
treaty favors residence countries it does disadvantage developing
countries by layering the tax treatment (which might be net neutral
for two countries in comparable economic positions) on top of the
pre-existing economic and investment imbalances between the two
countries. Why do the developing countries continue, for the most
part, to participate in (and in fact often clamor for) bilateral treaties
even on these general terms? As described below, the treaties pro-
vide benefits that the market has failed to provide-coordination of
the tax rules between nations. Thus, without rejecting the existence of
245 See, e.g., Krasner, Global Communications, note 82, at 351-53 (describing an exam-
ple of weaker states using a regime to achieve a result slightly more favorable than their
initial power position would have secured).
246 The UN Ad Hoc Group of Experts
decided to use the OECD Model Convention as its main reference text in or-
der to take advantage of the accumulated technical expertise embodied in that
Convention and the Commentary thereon, and also for reasons of practical
convenience stemming from the fact that the Convention was being used by
OECD member countries in the negotiation of tax treaties not only with each
other but also with developing countries.
See UN Model Treaty, note 214, at x. The OECD and the U.N. Model Treaties also over-
lapped in personnel as well. Stanley Surrey, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy (1961-
69), and one of the "dominant player[s]" in the 1960's in tax policy, "was also a major
player in international organizations like the OECD (which issued its model tax treaty in
1963 ... heavily influenced by Surrey) and the UN (Surrey was the major force behind the
UN 1980 model tax treaty)." Reuven Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four
Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 313, 327 (2005).
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some power and distributional elements on the formation of the
double taxation regime, the double tax regime does not seem ade-
quately explained by reference to these factors. The next Subsection
considers how a neoliberal view of regime formation illuminates the
activities described above.
b. Neoliberalist Regime Theory-Market Failure Explanations
i. Bargaining Game Model
In order to assess the applicability of the neoliberal model, this Sub-
section begins by trying to identify the type of bargaining game in-
volved. Recall the idea is that without the regime, the states are not
engaged in "optimal" (that is, efficient) behavior. There are Pareto
efficient outcomes the states could seek that would make at least one
state better off without making the other worse off. Without coopera-
tion, however, that Pareto efficient outcome will not be achieved. The
expectation is that in some cases formation of a regime can provide
the needed cooperation. The type of "game" being played impacts
that likelihood that regime formation will be possible. Four basic
types of games (suasion, prisoner's dilemma/collaboration, coordina-
tion, and assurance) were outlined in Part II.
As an initial matter, if cooperation means that a country unilaterally
provides an FTC or exemption of foreign source income, 247 and defec-
tion means that a country refuses such a credit or exemption, then the
parties arguably prefer joint cooperation.248 In the absence of any co-
ordinated strategy, how would country A and country B each respond
to the existence of double taxation? Assuming A and B view double
taxation as undesirable (because each wants its residents to engage in
cross-border business to stimulate its economy and enhance the eco-
nomic well-being of the country and its residents), they would relieve
double taxation for their residents regardless of the other country's
decision. Thus, even if B does not relieve the double taxation of its
residents, A would provide the credit/exemption for its own residents
247 As discussed earlier, both the FTC and the exemption method alleviate double taxa-
tion by advantaging source-based taxation. It is also possible to reduce double taxation by
granting more taxing rights to the residence country over source. However, given that a
primary motivation behind the double taxation movement in the 1920's was a concern that
one's own residents be able to pursue cross-border business activities without undue (or
perhaps crippling) tax burdens, countries willing to try to resolve the double taxation prob-
lem unilaterally could do so by only relinquishing their own rights to tax-granting the FTC
or providing an exemption. Thus, the "cooperative" strategy at this stage implies granting
an FTC or exemption, which also relinquishes residence country taxation in favor of the
source country.
248 Joint cooperation (both countries granting an FTC) would significantly reduce
double taxation.
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because A's loss of tax revenue is offset by the economic benefits of
having A's own residents pursue cross-border business opportunities.
While B, at least in the short run, may have extra tax revenue, B's
residents will likely reduce their cross-border activities, which nega-
tively impacts B's tax revenues and B's broader economic picture.249
Thus, cooperation, even in the face of defection, is the preferred strat-
egy for A and B. 250
Moreover, cooperation (that is, the use of a credit or exemption) by
both A and B is probably their preferred outcome out of the four
possible results (both A and B cooperate, both A and B defect, A
cooperates and B defects, A defects and B cooperates). Taxpayers in
A, under some circumstances, may be treated as residents of B (if, for
example, the country A taxpayer had a subsidiary in B). In such cases,
A would prefer that B relieve double taxation for its residents because
A's grant of an FTC or exemption would not help the subsidiary in B
earning income in country C. Furthermore, mirroring assumptions
from the trade arena, A may adopt the view that it benefits when the
global economy is more open and investments and activities can freely
move around the world. If B does not relieve its residents' double
taxation, that may hinder this economic mobility, and decrease invest-
ment in A by B residents.2 5 1
In terms of possible outcomes, joint defection is the worst. If
neither A nor B relieve their residents' double taxation then each
country's own residents will not pursue valued global commercial ac-
tivities (triggering corresponding national economic and revenue ef-
fects), and the global economy overall may suffer. Implicit in the
above analysis is the conclusion that an outcome in which one cooper-
ates and the other defects is less desirable, but not as undesirable as
mutual defection.
Thus, the four possible outcomes can be ranked in terms of A's
likely preference (best to worst): 252 (1) joint cooperation, (2) A coop-
erates and B defects, (3) A defects and B cooperates, and (4) both A
and B defect. An important assumption made here, that will be re-
249 If B does not implement a credit or exemption, there is an indirect effect on A, as B
residents will be discouraged from foreign investment, including investment in A.
250 "Preferred strategy" here indicates that it is the action the party would likely choose
in the absence of any coordination.
251 Of course A could provide some limited relief to the double taxation faced by coun-
try B residents in those cases where the B residents are earning income in A by exempting
them from source country (that is, country A) tax. This outcome requires A to highly value
the global free flow of investments, given that the investors are not their own residents, or
to strongly desire the investment into A. Even if A would consider offering this relief, it
presumably would prefer that B resolve the double taxation of B's own residents.
252 B's preferences would be the same, except the labeling of A and B in the listings
would be reversed.
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laxed later, is that A and B both share the principle that double taxa-
tion is harmful and should be avoided. They then adopt the norm that
residence countries should yield to source (this adoption may be ei-
ther a function of unilateral practicality253 or of their views of legiti-
mate taxing jurisdiction). Finally, the rules they use to implement
their norms and principles here (the FTC and exemption system) are
sufficiently compatible without further accommodation (but would
benefit from additional coordination). The assumption that A and B
share a similar vision of the principles, norms, and rules is realistic
where both A and B are developed countries. If, however, A is a de-
veloped country and B is a developing country, then the assumption
must be re-evaluated, which the next Subsection does.
Based on the above analysis and rank ordering of outcomes for A
and B (as two developed countries), what type of bargaining game
characterizes the double taxation scenario? The suasion game is elim-
inated because this is not a case where there is a single equilibrium
that makes one party happy but not the other. The prisoner's di-
lemma also is eliminated because the outcome that results in this
double taxation case, without any mutual agreement, is the Pareto op-
timal outcome. A coordination game fails to describe the double tax-
ation case because, under the core assumptions in the problem, the
choice is either to cooperate (institute a unilateral FTC or exemption
system) or defect (offer your residents no relief from double taxation).
Both A and B can arrive at rules (an implementation) that will work
without negotiation between them (they can choose either the FTC or
exemption system, and effective cooperation will follow). 254 Finally,
an assurance game characterization also fails because in such a game
(for example, stag hunt) both parties favor the same outcome (cooper-
ation-getting the stag) but also favor joint defection (getting two rab-
bits) over a cooperation/defection pattern (getting one rabbit). In
contrast, with double taxation, country A (or B) would prefer to "co-
operate" even if the other state defects, as evidenced by the unilateral
FTC examples.
If it is true that none of the categories applies, and that the double
taxation problem is not a "game" in which the parties' must coordi-
nate their actions to achieve desired outcomes, 255 why have countries
253 If a country strongly holds the principle that international double taxation of its re-
sidents should be avoided, the only unilateral option open is for that country to offer its
residents an FrC or exemption.
254 In contrast, the air traffic controllers example revealed widespread agreement on the
need for a single language but disagreement over the implementation (selection of a
language).
255 One could argue that a fifth choice from the international relations literature applies:
a harmony game. In a harmony game, both sides unilaterally prefer, and thus cause, the
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pursued an elaborate process of developing and negotiating model
and actual income tax treaties to relieve double taxation? It appears
that both A and B would unilaterally come to the same conclusion and
adopt double taxation relief without reliance on any "regime" to facil-
itate the process.
The answer is that this view misses a key point: There are in fact
two levels of "cooperation." The first level of cooperation concerns
the decision to offer double taxation relief for residents-an outcome
that seems to flow from unilateral decisionmaking. The second level
of cooperation, however, concerns optimization of the double taxation
relief mechanism. Although I previously asserted that no coordina-
tion of the rules was required in relieving double taxation, and that A
could adopt the credit and B could adopt the exemption method, that
is in fact an overstatement. In theory A and B can adopt mechanisms
unilaterally that should provide adequate relief from double taxation.
In reality, however, the likely intersections of their tax rules (such as
tax definitions and source rules) require some coordination to provide
maximum relief from double taxation. 256 Where differences exist on
these elements, double taxation will persist, even if, for example, both
countries grant an FTC. Taking the provision of an FTC/exemption as
a baseline, then the game is really about the implementation details
and the coordination necessary to ensure full relief. Countries may be
very willing to take these details seriously and devote resources to
their resolution where the double taxation situations are iterative
games as many taxpayers from the two countries keep facing the inter-
section of the countries' rules.
Having established that the treaty regime is not about the basic im-
plementation of double taxation relief (that would be achieved unilat-
erally) but rather about the complicated matter of ensuring complete
relief, I now must determine the kind of game that represents the in-
teraction. The best category would appear to be a coordination game
(the air traffic controller example). Both A and B would prefer "co-
operation," here understood to be the use of shared definitions and
detailed rules (such as source definitions and allocation rights). Some
mechanism is necessary to reach agreement on these rules (similar to
the selection of the air traffic control language) 257 and once they are
cooperative outcome without the need for a regime. This game was not discussed earlier
because it provides little guidance on regime creation. Moreover, it clearly was not rele-
vant here as a regime was created to enable agreement on the questions central to imple-
menting the FTC.
256 Some of these potential challenges and complications, such as the allocation of in-
come between two countries, are discussed below.
257 Just as having a country's native language selected for the uniform standard can be
desirable, so too having tax rules and definitions that resonate more clearly with a coun-
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set, the parties do not have a very strong incentive to defect from the
definitions.
One notable distinction separates the double taxation case from the
classic coordination game of the air traffic controller, although ulti-
mately this distinction should not be enough to render the coordina-
tion classification invalid. Unlike the air traffic controller example,
258
it is possible that countries might perceive a defection from certain
double tax rules and definitions to be to their advantage if this defec-
tion increases their tax base, while the other country continues to fol-
low definitions that limit its taxing power. In truth, such defections
are not in the country's medium- to long-term interests given two con-
nected facts: Double taxation is an iterative game, and defections
generally will be transparent. If country A defects (refuses to follow
coordinating rules and definitions), this defection will be transparent
because it will immediately affect country B residents who will be very
unhappy about their tax treatment. They will face unexpected double
taxation because, for example, A is taxing an item of income that had
been allocated to B under the treaty. Generally, B also would tax that
item, as permitted under the treaty (that is, B cooperates). The result-
ing double taxation will trigger two responses. First, the residents of B
will hesitate to invest in A because the existence of the treaty is no
protection against double taxation. Second, B may seek to formally
end the treaty or may engage in defections similar to A. Either or
both of these outcomes is undesirable for A; thus A is unlikely to de-
fect from the agreement. 259
How difficult will it be to reach this agreement, from which neither
A nor B will likely defect? Assuming that both A and B are devel-
oped countries with comparable investment flows, then mutual coop-
eration should achieve improved trade and investment activity. If
flows are equal between the states, then regardless of whether the de-
cision is made to favor the source or the residence country in the allo-
cation of taxing rights, the net revenue effect to the states should be
try's domestic tax rules or that seem to grant the country some additional potential reve-
nue can be desirable. Countries will not naturally and unilaterally reach the same
conclusions on these issues, and thus the regime is necessary to facilitate an agreement on
the details (language or tax rules).
258 A country's decision to defect from the selection of English as the universal air traffic
controller language will likely result in the crash of a domestic plane in another country, or
a foreign plane in a defecting country. Neither result is desirable, even in the short run.
Hence defection is very unlikely.
259 Although defection is unlikely, that does not mean that countries would not com-
plain or lobby for a change in the rules (that is, the "language" selected in the air traffic
controller imagery).
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the same. Thus, the distributive effects of the rules would be rela-
tively minor and agreement quite probable. 260
Application Involving a Developing Country
How does the analysis change if country A is a developed country
and country B is a developing country? 261 Returning to the threshold
cooperation decision of whether to provide double taxation relief, A's
ranking should remain the same. The dominant force behind A's de-
sire to relieve double taxation for its residents was the view that such
relief improved the economic and revenue picture for A. 262 B, how-
ever, may have a quite different perspective if it has few residents that
are ready and able to pursue cross-border investment opportunities
(or even domestic ones), and B greatly desires investment into its
country. Under these assumptions, B's rankings (from best to worst)
on the basic cooperation question (relief or no relief) would be: (1) A
260 This is not to suggest that countries of comparable investment flows will have no
conflict in negotiating their double taxation treaties. Some conflict is quite likely-both
because flows and economic circumstances will never be identical, and because countries
may have reasons beyond direct economic impact for preferring some rules over others.
That said, the more similar the economic status of the two countries the fewer distributive
effects the rules typically will generate.
261 It is also possible that A and B are both developing countries. The text does not
elaborate on this scenario because it is less likely to lead to any negotiations over a treaty,
and where it does, the structure of the dynamics more closely mirrors that of two devel-
oped countries. If both A and B are developing, then they primarily seek investment,
which neither of them has to offer. Neither A nor B is eager for its own residents to invest
abroad instead of at home, and so at a unilateral level they will be inclined to offer no
relief. A and B are not seriously concerned about whether the other offers relief to its own
residents because those residents have nothing to invest and so the added drag on invest-
ment from double taxation is not significant. At the margin, B might prefer that A offer
relief, just in case a resident of A was considering an investment in B. That preference is
relatively weak, however, and not likely to prompt B to pursue treaty negotiations. Plus, in
negotiation, A would demand that B offer relief as well, which B is not inclined to do,
especially where the "upside" of the deal is very little investment from residents of A.
On the unilateral decision of offering relief, both A and B will defect (offer no relief).
That is a Pareto efficient outcome because the only change that might make B better off
would be if A offered relief, but that would make A worse off (because it is trying to keep
investment inside A). See text accompanying notes 262-63 (analysis of a developing coun-
try's perspective on double taxation, investment, and priority setting). The characteriza-
tion of countries as either developed or developing is clearly a broad brush. The label
helps to focus on the countries' quantity of residents capable of significant foreign invest-
ment and on the countries' need and ability to attract domestic investment. In reality,
countries vary on these dimensions, and that variation affects their assessment of the bene-
fits and costs of treaty negotiations. For example, if A and B each have some resident
investor base that they are trying to protect from double taxation abroad and that the
other is hoping to attract, A and B will negotiate like the pair of developed countries (even
though they may be labeled as developing vis a vis a third country). If A and B are both
developing countries according to conventional labels, but A has more resident investors,
then the analysis would mirror that of a developed/developing country pairing.
262 These expectations seem reflected in the U.S. unilateral decision to implement the
FIC in 1918. See notes 186-89.
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cooperates and B defects, (2) both A and B cooperate, (3) both A and
B defect, and (4) A defects and B cooperates. This ranking reflects
B's priority of getting (and keeping) investment in its own country. If
A cooperates and B defects, then the residents of A can invest in B
without fear of double taxation ("good" for B). At the same time the
few residents of B with investment capacity, at least to some degree,
will prefer investment in B to avoid the double taxation that will occur
with investment outside B ("good" according to B's stated goal of in-
creasing investment in B). If both A and B cooperate, then A re-
sidents will invest in B ("good" for B) but B's few resident investors
will invest (to some degree) outside country B ("bad" according to B's
identified goals). A still less desirable result follows from joint defec-
tion because if A offers no relief from double taxation, then A re-
sidents will not invest in B ("very bad" for B), although at least B's
few resident investors will be inclined to invest in B ("good" for B).
Least desirable is the outcome in which A defects and thus its re-
sidents will not invest in B ("very bad" for B), and B cooperates and
its residents invest outside B ("bad" for B).
Two observations emerge from this effort to identify the prefer-
ences where A and B are developed and developing. First, the likely
outcome, in the absence of agreement between A and B, is A cooper-
ates and B defects. Second, B does not just prefer an outcome in
which A cooperates and B defects. It actually matters to B how A
achieves relief of double taxation. If A selects the exemption method,
B has an opportunity, should it choose, to levy little or no source
country tax in order to encourage residents of A to invest in B. Con-
versely, if A selects the FTC (at least in the absence of tax sparing),263
B gains little or nothing264 by imposing a rate of tax lower than A
263 The FTC provides a benefit to the residence country taxpayer only when the source
jurisdiction actually levies an income tax. If the source jurisdiction imposes little or no tax
(to attract investment), the residence country taxpayers would still face residence country
taxation on the foreign source income (either currently, if operating in branch form, or
later, if operating in the source country through a subsidiary). Thus, the source jurisdiction
is limited in its ability to use a low tax rate to attract investment. To counter this effect,
some residence countries have implemented tax sparing provisions to assist source coun-
tries that are also developing countries. Under tax sparing, if a resident earns income in
the developing source country and that country levies no income tax, the residence country
will still provide a credit for a "phantom" tax deemed paid to the source country. See, e.g.,
Alvin C. Warren Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 Tax
L. Rev. 131, 152 n.98 (2001). Thus, the residence country investor benefits from investing
in the no-tax source country, and presumably will be drawn to invest there as a result.
264 B can benefit from implementing a zero or low-tax rate in two ways. First, if re-
sidents of A invest in B through a country B subsidiary, then country A tax may be de-
ferred until the subsidiary pays a dividend (assuming no anti-deferral rules apply). Second,
A must be aware of the income earned in B in order to effectively tax it. That is, if re-
sidents of A are willing to evade tax otherwise due to A on their foreign source income,
then a zero-tax source country would be appealing.
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because A will first impose its tax on the income of residents of A and
then permit a credit for any B taxes.
Arguably the resulting outcome, A cooperates and B does not, is a
Pareto optimal result. No one's position can be improved without
harming the other: The outcome reflects B's first choice, and to the
extent A would prefer that they both cooperate, a move in that direc-
tion would make A better off, but would make B worse off. In terms
of a "game" type, the developed/developing country pairing looks like
a suasion game where one party wants to defect and the other has a
dominant strategy to cooperate. Thus, one might anticipate that A
would have to entice B into "cooperation."
In truth, however, just as with the developed/developed country
pairing, there are two levels of decisionmaking. The preliminary deci-
sion concerns whether to offer unilateral relief. On that, the devel-
oped/developing country pairing produces a seeming equilibrium of
cooperation/defection. In reality, however, both A and B need more
than their unilateral action to fully achieve their goals. To ensure that
there is no double taxation, A wants to specify with B the details of
how country A residents will be taxed on their income and activities in
B. This step requires a regime in which they can reach agreement
(and produce a treaty). But again this raises the obvious question:
Why would B participate? Recall that B's driving motivation was not
relief of double taxation, but rather the encouragement of investment
into B. A small amount of investment will come from country B resi-
dent investors who feel forced to invest in B because they face double
taxation on foreign source income (B offers no credit or exemption).
Country A investors, who bring the bulk of investment into B, will not
come if they face double taxation or uncertainty. 265 Given B's goal to
increase investment, B will strive to reduce double taxation and
uncertainty.
As to double taxation there are two ways to ensure country A re-
sidents will not suffer: negotiate a treaty and iron out the details with
country A, or not tax country A residents (that is, impose no source
country tax). A treaty would allow B to actually collect some tax
without driving country A residents away. Alternatively, a zero tax
could serve as strong attraction for investment (at the cost of reve-
nue)-but in many cases it will require that the country A resident
265 Obviously, investment in B by country A residents is not subject to an on/off switch.
Even in the face of uncertainty and/or double taxation, some country A residents may
invest in B. What can be said is that uncertainty and double taxation will seriously dampen
enthusiasm for investment in B, and may also limit the types of investments that are con-
sidered attractive.
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invest in B through a country B subsidiary.2 66 This tradeoff suggests
that B might not care about pursuing a treaty, at least if it is willing to
forgo taxing residents of A. If, however, it intends to tax residents of
country A, or if it wants to address the second problem facing inves-
tors from country A, uncertainty, then B might seek a treaty. The
treaty resolves uncertainty both explicitly and implicitly. Treaties ex-
plicitly ameliorate uncertainty by addressing questions of potential
ambiguity or rule overlap, and by providing a framework through
which to resolve conflict with B using the help of A (the competent
authority mechanism). Treaties can also reduce uncertainty implicitly
by signaling that B, a developing country, is playing according to well-
known and established rules (as spelled out in the treaties) and has
already been able to negotiate and work with the residence country
(as demonstrated by the treaty negotiations), and therefore is an via-
ble investment destination.
Thus, for at least a significant subset of developing countries, their
real preference is in fact cooperation (that is, relief of double taxation
and full resolution of the details) by both A and B. Although their
desire for investment initially might lead them to favor an outcome of
cooperation by A and defection by B, a fuller consideration of their
investment goals will lead them to "embrace" the principle of elimi-
nating double taxation. Moreover, they also will share the norm that
the residence country should yield to source, as they are generally
capital importers and hence their dominant role is as a source country.
The details, however, may prove more troublesome, as described be-
low, because many rules will not be a wash where the investments
flows between A and B are not equal. These developing countries will
be willing to move forward with the negotiation of a treaty-although
in that process, their status as developing countries will influence their
views on the rules and the ease with which agreement will be reached.
The remaining subset of developing countries, those, for example,
that are primarily interested in zero taxation and who believe that
they are sufficiently well-known to investors to be attractive jurisdic-
tions, may stop at the first decisionmaking level (unilateral double tax-
ation relief). Country A will provide relief (credit or exemption) and
B either will provide no relief, or will provide it but not seek to coor-
dinate with A.
Returning to the subset of developing countries that seek to negoti-
ate a treaty, the selection of rules will be difficult. In a treaty context,
a given country is both a residence country and a source country. If
266 See text accompanying note 264 (explaining the circumstances in which a country A
resident can defer A tax on its foreign source income, and thus benefit in the interim from
a low or zero tax rate at source).
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the flows between the two negotiating countries are equal, then a
treaty that favors the residence country or the source country does not
in reality favor either of the two countries. If, however, A is a devel-
oped country and B is a developing country, the choice of rules (the
specific method of "cooperation") to accomplish the elimination of
double taxation will not be revenue neutral (as compared to a pairing
of developed countries). In terms of real investment flows, the devel-
oped country will be predominantly the capital exporting country, that
is, the residence country, and the developing country will be predomi-
nantly the capital importing country, that is, the source country. As
an example, recall that in the 1920's, debates over the various formu-
lations of the allocation of taxing rights to source or residence coun-
tries were significant where the countries perceived themselves as
being creditor or debtor nations. The creditor nations would benefit
from "pro "-residence country rules and the debtor nations would ben-
efit from "pro"-source country rules.
Under these circumstances, the coordination game in double taxa-
tion has a strong distributional component (in contrast to the coordi-
nation game example of air traffic controllers). Although B has made
the decision to provide and coordinate double taxation relief (unlike
the other subset of developing countries), it may be hesitant to coop-
erate in the second level of the game267 if coordination means adjust-
ments that favor developed countries. Country B would need to
determine whether the loss of revenue from acceding to those adjust-
ments would be offset by increases in valued economic investment
and activity.2 68 The reaction of many emerging and developing coun-
tries to the possibility of a tax treaty with the United States suggests
that on balance they view having the treaty as desirable for the rea-
sons identified earlier: (1) The business community is comforted by
the existence of a treaty. (2) Treaties signal a country is part of the
global economic and business mainstream. (3) Treaties provide a pro-
cedural bridge (for example, for dispute resolution). (4) Treaties pro-
vide predictability by answering questions on the intersection of the
two countries' systems.2 69 Despite their interest in reaching agree-
ment, the developing countries still resisted a rule framework that was
not neutral to them. For that reason, the OECD's traditional formula-
tion was less appealing. What developing countries sought was an ap-
proach to double taxation that was cognizant of their distinct position.
The work of the UN, falling on the heels of the OECD Model Treaty
267 This second level involves coordination of the definitions and adjustments to the
allocation of taxing rights between the source and residence countries.
268 This point actually reflects the neorealist idea that regimes could perform certain
functions including allowing differential treatment for "weaker" states.
269 See text accompanying notes 266-67.
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(which had gained broad acceptance), can be understood as playing
this role, to the extent it provided an alternative yet sufficiently famil-
iar structure for coordination involving countries with unequal flows.
Thus, although complex factors dominate the double taxation case,
the coordination game seems a relatively strong description of the na-
ture of the interactions. As such, one might expect better success at
regime formation than in the case of the suasion games or prisoner
dilemma games. 270 Although extensive monitoring may not be neces-
sary, defection cannot be ruled out as readily as in the classic coordi-
nation game example of air traffic controller language. 27
1
ii. Regime Topic
After determining the nature of the bargaining game involved, the
next step (under a neoliberalist approach) is to consider the impact of
the topic itself on the likelihood of regime formation. Conflicts are
disagreements over either: means, values, relatively assessed goods, or
absolutely assessed goods. Depending on the type of conflict, regimes
are more or less likely: Conflicts over absolutely assessed goods (for
example, food) are most conducive to regimes; conflicts over means
(for example, method of reaching an agreed result) are the next most
conducive; conflicts over relatively assessed goods (for example,
weapons) are less conducive; and conflicts over value (for example,
human rights) are the least conducive. 272 As a general matter there
seems little disagreement that double taxation is a problem (although
the measures taken to eliminate it may indicate differing views on the
severity of the problem). This conclusion is reflected in the observa-
tions on a developed/developed pairing: Both A and B will unilater-
ally "cooperate" and provide relief. In a developed/developing
pairing, the developing countries that participate are those that have
made the determination that overall reduction of double taxation is
desirable (even if they are not otherwise inclined to provide relief for
270 The assurance game characterization, which was rejected, would foreshadow easier
regime formation. See text accompanying note 132.
271 Certainly examples of defection can be identified, such as U.S. treaty overrides.
These defections are highly public and do not raise monitoring issues. In addition, U.S. law
seeks to minimize the likelihood of treaty overrides, at least explicit ones. See IRC § 7852;
see also S. Rep. No. 100-445, at 321 (1988) (". . . neither the treaty nor the [U.S. tax] law
shall have preferential status by reason of its being a treaty or a law... [t]he committee
does not intend this codification to alter the initial presumption of harmony between, for
example, earlier treaties and later statutes."). Ultimately, defections of this sort can be
viewed as unilateral renegotiations of the rules that will risk triggering retaliation. The
decision of the treaty partner on the retaliation question requires an independent analysis
of risks and benefits.
272 See text accompanying note 145.
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their own residents). Thus, there seems to be no serious debate over
values.
Does the double taxation issue involve a conflict over means?
Again countries seem to agree that one jurisdiction (residence or
source) must surrender taxing rights in some circumstances, and the
tensions arise over which jurisdiction that will be and to what extent.
That debate is not founded on a disagreement about whether favoring
source or favoring residence is actually more effective at achieving the
goal of eliminating double taxation (a question of means), 273 but
rather on an allocation issue of who may have to bear any burden for
achieving this goal. Unless the flows between the countries are equal,
favoring source or residence will impose some burden on one of the
countries.274 Thus, the conflict concerns goods, here, the tax revenue.
This leaves the question of whether the conflict is over relatively
assessed or absolutely assessed goods. Given that the distinction turns
on whether a country's enjoyment of the goods correlates with how
much of the goods the other country has, the application in the double
tax context is not completely self-evident. First, tax revenues are
money and money of course is power, as well as the ability to buy
goods of any type, whether relatively or absolutely assessed. This ob-
servation provides little initial guidance as to the classification of the
double taxation conflict. Second, where the countries involved have
relatively equal investment flows, an agreement of any type should
improve those flows for both parties, which is a benefit. Whether the
specifics of the agreement favor residence or source should not have a
significant distributional effect on the parties. Described in this way
the conflict seems less about goods and more about the means (that is,
the details as to which choice of rules is more effective), as noted
above. In that case, the conflict is of the type second most likely to
support regime formation.
To the extent the parties are not equals, for example A is a devel-
oped country and B is a developing country, tax dollars are at stake
and the money as power characterization applies. Tax revenue is liq-
uid and could readily become any asset the state sought. Thus, the
double taxation issue could be viewed as a conflict over relatively as-
sessed goods because countries value revenue in part by reference to
how it compares to that of other countries. If this assessment is accu-
rate, then the likelihood of regime formation for a developed and a
273 Although there was discussion on a more theoretical level about the relative merits
of source and residence countries' claims to tax revenue, the core double taxation debate
seems more of an allocation battle between capital importers and capital exporters, and
later between developed and developing countries. See text accompanying notes 182-12.
274 See text accompanying notes 259-60.
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developing country is less than for two developed countries, where the
conflict could be characterized as a conflict over means.
Is it accurate, though, to view a dispute over revenue as a conflict
over relatively assessed goods simply because a country could
purchase such goods with its tax dollars? Food, which is often consid-
ered an absolutely assessed good, in theory (and in reality) could be
used to buy guns, which typically are considered a relatively assessed
good.275 Does this "substitution" argument undermine any distinction
between conflicts over relatively and absolutely assessed goods? If
countries were actually negotiating over food, should the conflict be
characterized as a conflict over relatively assessed goods because food
could buy guns? Despite the blurring of the distinction between the
two categories of goods due to their exchangeability in the market, the
distinction between relatively and absolutely assessed goods may still
be a valuable measure of the likelihood of agreement. In the actual
negotiation process, the nature of the good literally "on the table"
might influence the negotiations (perhaps because of its salience and
proximity). Thus, even though food can be used to buy guns, a dis-
pute over food nevertheless may be less sensitive in a concrete negoti-
ation than a dispute over weapons.
Where does this leave the categorization of the double taxation con-
flict, and how much does it matter? If the double taxation conflict is
viewed as conflict over absolutely assessed goods, then the likelihood
of reaching agreement is better than if it is viewed as a conflict over
relatively assessed goods. If it constitutes a conflict over means, then,
agreement should be easier to achieve than with relatively assessed
goods, but not as likely as with absolutely assessed goods. Labeling
does not make negotiations over revenue easier or harder, but a more
accurate understanding of the conflict may improve understanding of
the negotiation process. The history of bilateral tax treaties supports
the idea that for countries of comparable economic situation (for ex-
ample, two developed countries) the double taxation issue may most
closely resemble a conflict over means, which is the second most read-
ily formed agreement. When the UN and the developing world
looked at the then-existing model treaty (from the OECD) in the
1960's, they concluded that the terms were not easy for a developing
country to accept, although they had worked adequately for the devel-
oped world.276 From the perspective of the developing world this was
no "means" dispute; serious tax revenue was at stake.
275 Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 64.
276 United Nations, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between De-
veloped and Developing Countries 2-3 (1979).
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Ultimately several conclusions can be drawn regarding the nature of
the regime topic and how conducive it is to regime formation. First,
where revenue flows are comparable, the rules allocating taxing rights
have minimal distributional effect and are best characterized as a con-
flict over means. Not surprisingly, such conflicts are, on balance, eas-
ier to resolve than conflicts over relatively assessed goods (for
example, weapons). Second, where revenue flows are not compara-
ble, actual distributional consequences follow from whether the rules
favor the source or residence jurisdiction. One country will obtain
more goods (revenue) depending on how the rules are drafted. Third,
whether the distributional dispute is a conflict over relatively assessed
goods or absolutely assessed goods cannot be definitely answered, but
the unique nature of money suggests that it may be somewhere in the
middle. Money is not as benign as wheat on the negotiating table, nor
it is as contentious as weapons, and certainly it can be converted into
either. Finally, although the analysis has depicted a negotiation in
which the flows between A and B are either equal or not equal, this
picture oversimplifies the negotiation process. It is quite possible that
on some issues A and B have comparable flows, but that on others
they have different and unequal positions. Thus, within the negotia-
tion over treaty rules there may be some conflicts over means and
some conflicts over goods. Depending on the overall balance, likeli-
hood of success may vary. 277
iii. Background Factors Influencing Regime Formation
Having determined the game model, and the probable classification
of the conflict, the last basic step in the neoliberal approach to regime
analysis examines the "background factors"-those that can influence
the success or failure of regime formation. Some of the major factors
include frequency of interaction, distribution of issue-specific re-
277 As noted earlier, the literature on issue type argues that disputes over absolutely
assessed goods are easier to resolve than those without a distributional component (the
dispute over means). See text accompanying note 145. Presumably the intuition is that a
finite resource will virtually force an agreement between contending parties. The frequent
observation in international tax (that parties to an income tax treaty should not be very
concerned over the specific formulation of the rules if the parties have comparable invest-
ment flows) seems to contradict the rank ordering of conflict types. See ALl, Federal
Income Tax Project, International Aspects of U.S. Income Taxation II, Proposals of the
American Law Institute on U.S. Income Tax Treaties 220 (1992). Several explanations are
possible: (1) The rank ordering is different in tax. (2) The observations from the tax world
implicitly assume that distributional conflicts in double taxation are essentially conflicts
over relatively assessed goods, which are more difficult to resolve than conflicts over
means. (3) The observations from the tax world are simply wrong guesses born of an
inattention to a detailed international relations evaluation of double taxation. Further re-
search may illuminate this question.
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sources, presence or absence of salient solutions, number of actors in
the issue area, and availability of leadership. Not all factors are ex-
pected to influence all game structures equally. For double taxation,
the frequency of interaction combined with the "semi-exogenous"
shock of World War I's high tax rates may have galvanized a measure
of interest in resolving double taxation issues. 278 The distribution of
issue specific resources, another way of describing whether the two
states have comparable investment flows, impacts ease of regime for-
mation (comparable flows are a conflict over means whereas unequal
flows are a conflict over goods).
As to solutions, the mechanisms for reducing double taxation (FTC
or exemption) were theoretically well established and relatively clear
in their application. The challenge arose in agreeing to a given appli-
cation's distributional effects and coordinating the intersections of the
states' distinctive domestic regimes. The difficulty in this area seems
borne out by the fact that although the model treaties279 were the
product of a group of nations (ICC, League of Nations, OEEC,
OECD, and U.N.) the end products have been bilateral treaties. This
held true, despite the fact that many participants along the way advo-
cated for a multilateral treaty. 280 Because of the large number of ac-
tors in the issue, any formal, binding multilateral agreement would
have been more difficult. Some analysts have argued that the model
treaties should be viewed as effectively a multilateral agreement on
double taxation with the individually negotiated bilateral treaties serv-
ing as the equivalent of national reservations to the basic document.
281
Obviously, this analogy is a stretch but it does capture the sense that
there is more multilateral agreement on double taxation than the use
of bilateral treaties otherwise might indicate. Moreover, the fact that
countries approving the OECD Model Treaty can make their own in-
dividual observations and reservations to the model commentary sup-
ports the image of multilateral agreement with specified national
reservations.
282
278 See Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1046.
279 The exception is the U.S. Model Treaty, but even this showed the strong influence of
the multilateral models that preceded it, and indeed, on which the U.S. Model Treaty is
structurally based.
280 See, e.g., U.N. Model Treaty, note 214, at ix (stating that a Group of Eminent Per-
sons appointed by the UN Secretary-General recommended a worldwide multilateral tax
agreement).
281 See, e.g., John F. Avery Jones, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Are Tax Treaties
Necessary? (Sept. 25, 1997), in 53 Tax L. Rev. 1, 6 (1999).
282 See, e.g., OECD, Positions on Article I and its Commentary, at T 1, in II Model
Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (2003).
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The final factor, leadership, is both elusive and potentially quite
powerful.283 Certainly in the early years of the U.S. income tax, a few
key individuals played a pivotal role in the formation of tax policy
including T.S. Adams (who pressed for the enactment of the U.S. FTC
and urged the importance of source jurisdiction) and Edwin Seligman
(who was one of the "four economists"). 284 The presence of a U.S.
leader (Adams) advocating a position on double taxation that "fa-
vored" source countries must have diffused some tension between the
debtor and creditor nation camps in the 1920's. 285 Of course, the fact
that Adams had difficulty persuading the United Kingdom shows the
limits to leadership power. 286 Furthermore, the differing positions of
two major U.S. figures in the 1920's, Adams and Seligman, reveal that
even a single country may not have a uniform voice, although Adams
clearly prevailed both in terms of domestic legislation (the FTC) and
international support for source jurisdiction.287 In later years, Stanley
Surrey played a dominant role in both the OECD and the U.N., dem-
onstrating the potential for individuals to transcend countries and
organizations. 288
The secondary factors, while not dispositive in terms of regime for-
mation nonetheless generally resonated with the actual experience in
the double taxation area. Once we have amassed a body of research
on international tax case studies from an international relations per-
spective, it will be useful to consider whether particular factors regu-
larly play a larger role in tax regime formation. In other subject areas,
such as environmental law, extensive analysis of many case studies has
demonstrated the recurrent importance of certain factors in establish-
ing regimes in those fields.
c. Cognitive Regime Theory
Although cognitivism has not stood alone as an independent theory
of regime formation, it has developed (in its "weak" theory version) a
complementary role with the neoliberalist and neorealist traditions,
through its examination of the impact of epistemic communities and
283 See, e.g., Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 246-47.
284 See Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1027; see also Seligman, note 186, at 114-65.
285 Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1038-41.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 1043-54, 1072.
288 Avi-Yonah, note 246, at 327.
288 See, e.g., Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 223 (reviewing the findings of a large
multi-sample research project in environmental law); see generally Oran R. Young, The
Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes, in The Effectiveness of Interna-
tional Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (Oran R.
Young ed., 1999); Young, note 151.
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the use of knowledge. 28 9 Even in the absence of a dominant state,
regimes can be created when a community of experts active across
multiple states develops a vision, raises public awareness, and lobbies
the government. Once a determination has been made that a particu-
lar regime is best characterized as either neorealist or neoliberalist,
the regime then is examined to consider whether epistemic communi-
ties significantly impacted regime formation.
In this double taxation case study, several international organiza-
tions (League of Nations, OEEC, OECD, and U.N.) played a central
role in gathering and organizing expertise, and using it to foster re-
gimes (the treaty models). In fact, the League of Nations labeled the
body it assembled to draft a model treaty as the "Committee of Tech-
nical Experts. '290 The organizations and their "experts" provided a
setting in which many of the detailed issues of international taxation
could be explored and elaborated by and among those with extensive
knowledge. In addition, the momentum within these organizations to
identify, enumerate, and solve the problems of double taxation pro-
pelled countries toward model treaties. The resulting model treaties
themselves had an independent life of their own, exemplified by the
U.N.'s decision to closely follow the OECD Model Treaty and depart
only where truly necessary to achieve the specific goals of the U.N.
2 91
The OECD Model Treaty had become such an established benchmark
that unnecessary departures from its structure and content would have
made the U.N. Model Treaty less attractive and less susceptible to
adoption.
These international organizations have been vital to treaty develop-
ment. But do they constitute epistemic communities? Typically these
organizations comprise official representatives from the individual
member countries. Differences in opinion can and do exist between
the representatives that the states send to an organization and the
states themselves.2 92 Nonetheless, these state-based international
bodies do not represent the most classic version of an "epistemic com-
289 See text accompanying notes 168-72, identifying four basic regime patterns, neoreal-
ist, neoliberalist, epistemic communities, and epistemically informed bargaining. Episte-
mic communities are groups of experts in a given field that can shape policy, disseminate
information and facilitate agreement. See text accompanying notes 160-62.
290 Seligman, note 186, at 143-65.
291 See note 242 and text accompanying note 246.
292 This point actually raises a complicated question about who speaks for the "state"
and whether it makes sense to describe the state as having a single view. In the most
simplistic usage, where the state's view refers to the bottom line position on an issue, there
still can be a gap between that position and the views of the individual representatives to
the organization. This may be especially likely if the individual has represented the state in
the organization for a number of years as domestic political power changes.
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munity" as understood by neoliberal theory.293 This tension between
the organizations as independent forces of experts and as reflections
of state interest can be seen in the observations Seligman made re-
garding the League of Nations Committee of Technical Experts:
[T]he report of the economic experts [the four economists]
was ...submitted for consideration to the official govern-
ment representatives, who became known under the name of
technical experts.... When the economic experts first met,
there was from the outset nothing but cordial cooperation, as
is entirely natural in the case of those who pursue the career
of science and who are interested only in the attainment of
truth. When, however, the technical experts came together,
their concern was primarily to enter into some arrangement
which would be politically agreeable to their respective
countries. Everyone accordingly brought with him, together
with a desire to arrive at a final arrangement, a feeling we
shall not say of hostility or even of suspicion, but at all events
of doubt .... [W]hen they learned to know each other more
intimately; and especially in proportion as they were sub-
jected to the indefinable but friendly atmosphere of the
League of Nations, their whole attitude changed. Suspicion
was converted into confidence; doubt was resolved by the
feeling of certainty of accomplishment; and aloofness gave
way to warm personal friendship which contributed materi-
ally to the smoothing out of difficulties. 294
The picture conveyed by this quote suggests a complicated dynamic
within the League of Nations that is not adequately captured by label-
ing the organization as a collection of countries. Moreover, these or-
ganizations have an independent internal leadership structure beyond
the basic membership of representative countries. For example, the
OECD is led by the Secretariat General, whose leadership is crucial to
the organization and must derive from a sense that he or she is not
"merely" the advocate for particular country.295 Even if these organi-
zations are not the prototypical epistemic communities, they play a
sufficiently similar role to require comparable attention.
293 A more classic example would be a group of scientists concerned about a developing
environmental hazard on which countries are not currently focused. If the scientists are
able to identify and understand the underlying environmental issue and reach a basic con-
sensus on how it should be handled, their views could both force countries to take the issue
seriously and shape the direction of the policy they develop.
294 Seligman, note 186, at 143-44.
295 OECD, Selection of a New Secretary General of the OECD, htp.//www.oecd.org/
secretarygeneral/selection.
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4. Conclusions from the Double Taxation Case Study
The application of regime theory analysis to the double taxation
case study generates the following specific conclusions (more general
observations are discussed in Part IV). First, analysis supports the
description of the double taxation relief system as a regime, with the
critical components of principle (double taxation is harmful), norm
(residence should yield to source), and rules (details coordinating the
intersection of two countries' tax laws).
Second, of the two dominant models of regime formation, the ne-
oliberalist more accurately reflects the experience of the double taxa-
tion regime. Although the neorealist focus on power (including
economic power) may be useful in explaining why one distributive
rule prevails over another in some treaty negotiations, the neoliberal-
ist model (which looks beyond power to the impact of game theory,
issue type, and background factors) offers a more comprehensive un-
derstanding of the regime formation process here. 296 For example, it
helps explain why countries negotiate these treaties despite the availa-
bility of a unilateral solution to double taxation, and why some coun-
tries pursue treaties and others do not.
Third, within the neoliberal model, the double taxation regime pro-
cess most closely mirrors a coordination game. As such, one would
expect that agreement would be relatively easier to achieve because
there is no monitoring problem (that is, no need to prevent defection).
The primary challenge in a coordination game is the need to reach a
decision that may have some distributive effects. The greater the dis-
tributional component of the coordination game, the more difficult it
is to reach a consensus. Thus, where negotiating countries A and B
are both developed countries with similar investment flows, fewer dis-
tributional issues should arise. If A is a developed country and B a
developing country, the selection of regime rules will carry distribu-
tional consequences that will impede agreement.
Fourth, the nature of the conflict in the double taxation regime im-
pacts regime formation. Following the observations articulated above
for the game theory aspect of the analysis, where A and B are simi-
larly situated, the conflict can be characterized as one over the
"means" of implementing double taxation relief. Regardless of
whether the selected rules favor residence or source, A and B will not
experience any serious distributional impact. If, however, A is a de-
veloped country and B is a developing country, then rules that favor
the residence country will typically favor A-adding a distributional
dimension to the conflict. Depending on how the distributional di-
296 See Subsection II.B.3.b.
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mension is viewed (conflict over absolutely or relatively assessed
goods, or somewhere in between), this factor increases the tension
and difficulty in reaching agreement on the rules.
Fifth, the background elements (including frequency of interaction,
availability of salient solutions, impact of exogenous shocks, and pres-
ence of strong individual leadership) enhance the explanatory success
of the other factors. For example, influential and credible individual
leaders (Adams, Seligman, and Surrey) appear prominently in the
double taxation story. Is this characteristic of regime formation in the
tax area? If it is, or if it is important in a subset of cases, how might
that realization impact regime strategies?
Finally, neoliberalist regime theory alone can not adequately ac-
count for the double taxation regime. The "epistemically informed
bargaining" model 297 more fully captures the factors crucial to regime
formation because it incorporates these expert communities into the
neoliberalist model. The epistemic community (as described by cogni-
tivist theory) served as a driving force in the double taxation problem,
both in terms of providing a forum for discussion and providing a base
of expertise to structure the debate. Although the precise contours of
this epistemic community and its role merit further attention, its sus-
tained importance in the process is powerfully demonstrated over the
decades.
IV. DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-INTERNATIONAL
TAx RESEARCH AGENDA
A. Introduction
The double taxation case study demonstrates how international re-
lations theory and methodology can contribute to our understanding
of even the most familiar of international tax stories. A recurrent
question in international tax is how and whether countries can reach
agreement on some problem or set of issues. Whether the topic is
transfer pricing, documentation standards, withholding, or arbitrage-
the real question has been whether a meaningful regime can be
formed. The international relations regime theory literature is de-
voted to understanding and answering that question. Based on the
initial application of regime theory to the double taxation case study,
two questions emerge: (1) What broader observations can one make?
(2) How should we design a research agenda to further the develop-
ment of international relations regime theory in international tax?
297 See Subsection III.B.3.c and text accompanying note 172.
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B. General Observations
1. Unique Role of Taxation
The first observation derives from the fact that regime theory has
been applied to many fields other than tax (for example, environment,
security). How is international tax different from these areas and why
might that matter to regime theory? In many other fields such as en-
vironmental or communication law, the government intervenes (that
is, regulates) because the market does not function adequately on its
own. For example, environmental regulations often address externali-
ties that are beyond the scope of the market to address and require
government intervention. In contrast, governments issue tax regula-
tions for revenue and wealth redistribution reasons, rather than to
remedy market failure. 298 In this way, states have a direct and unique
interest in their role as tax regulators.
In the international sphere, the government's role in providing tax
rules for cross-border transactions is no different. The state, as part of
its "domestic" revenue collection function, must define what is income
and who must pay taxes. Traditionally, states have taxed foreign
source income earned by their residents as well as income earned in
the state by nonresidents. Many countries are engaged in this taxing
function simultaneously and, not surprisingly, clashes occur and coop-
eration is required to resolve the conflict-they need a regime. As
countries form a regime, such as the double taxation regime, they
must integrate their multiple roles. The states can be seen as actors
pursuing an activity (taxation) and the international regime (in place
of a supranational government) regulates the activity so that it can
take place more efficiently (for example, reduced administrative bur-
dens on parties, information sharing, or increased efficiency of cross-
border investment). This characterization of regimes in international
tax supports the view that neoliberal regime theory better describes
regime formation in tax: Certainly that is the case for double taxation;
further research will establish whether the majority of tax regimes
share that quality.
In addition to improving taxing efficiency, the rules in a tax regime
can and do allocate revenue among the competing states. Several of
the double taxation regime scenarios (for example, where A was a
developed country and B was a developing country) included some
298 Tax, as a subject, is a complete construct of the government. Tax issues would not
exist in the absence of government tax regulation (although distributional needs would).
The type of tax regulation is not necessarily related to the particular distributive/revenue
goal being met. Although the primary force behind tax law is the need to collect revenue,
governments do use the tax system for secondary purposes as well, including the promo-
tion of social, political or economic goals.
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allocation of tax revenue that had distributional effects (effectively
favoring A or B). Governments are real stakeholders as to this reve-
nue and have expressed a strong sensitivity to incursions against their
"sovereignty" in the tax field. Whether this sovereignty claim can be
justified may relate to the state's somewhat special role as a different
kind of stakeholder in tax matters.
2. Importance of the Identity of Regime Participants
Of course countries are not equal in terms of their power or their
resources relevant to the regime area. In the double tax regime this
point emerged through the recognition that some double tax rules
would have distributional effects where the flows between countries
were not equal (as with a developed/developing country pair). How-
ever, even all developing (or all developed) countries are not equal.
The game theory analysis demonstrated that a developed country pair
could have distributional concerns in negotiating the double taxation
rules. Treaty negotiation between two countries can include some
rules with no distributional effects, and other rules with a small or
large distributional effect. Some developing countries will pursue a
double taxation regime while others will not, depending in part on the
type, nature, and quantity of foreign investment into the developing
country and the strength of the developing country's reputation as an
investment destination.
3. Details Matter
A productive and accurate use of the game theory models requires
a detailed knowledge of the substantive area being evaluated. In the
scenario with a developed/developing country pair, what initially
looked like a suasion game (in which A, the developed country must
"pay" B to participate), looked on further reflection like a coordina-
tion game because both A and B wanted to reach agreement on
double taxation to facilitate investment and neither benefited from
defection.
4. Benefits of Game Theory Analysis
Evaluating regime formation from a game theory perspective offers
two benefits. Using game theory requires the careful examination of
parties, goals, facts, constraints, and structure in a precise way that
disciplines one's analysis of the case study. A negotiator or other par-
ticipant in an international regime that undertook a game theory anal-
ysis would emerge a much better informed player in the process. To
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the extent that evidence suggests certain game types are more suscep-
tible to agreement or regime formation, this knowledge may offer
some predictive guidance on forward looking inquiries.
5. Regime Formation and Path Dependence
When states gather to evaluate a problem and seek to establish a
regime, they are likely to approach the problem from their own per-
spective. As a result, participation in the initial formation of the re-
gime can be critical to shaping the debate and its lasting
consequences. The "staying power" of regimes, exacerbates this "first
mover" problem. 299 If an organization (or set of states) makes the
first move at resolving an issue (even if that agreement fails to reflect
the interests of all possible participants), then the regime, once estab-
lished, may have a life of its own that effectively constrains the ability
of a second generation agreement from gaining the same degree of
prominence.
300
6. Overview Observations
At the end of the day, the value of international relations regime
theory to international tax resides not in a precise predictive power,
but rather in creating a framework that shapes thinking about interna-
tional tax questions. This framework forces one to examine various
templates or lenses to see how each one illuminates the particular in-
ternational tax problem. Despite the somewhat complicated and un-
resolved nature of regime theory, the coherence and organization it
brings to international tax will discipline our investigations into inter-
national agreements and will encourage tax scholars to appreciate in-
ternational tax relations as part of a broader system of international
relations.
C. Research Agenda
How should we design a research agenda to build upon the applica-
tion of international relations theory to international tax? What ques-
tions are especially pressing? Going forward several avenues of
inquiry are particularly important. First, as has been done in other
substantive fields, it will be valuable to develop a stable of case studies
299 See, e.g., Hasenclever et al., note 41, at 38 (discussing regime persistence).
300 Note for example the use of the same treaty structure and framework by the various
double taxation model treaties. This was true even for the U.N. despite its goal to counter
the OECD model treaty's focus on the needs of developed countries. ALI, note 277, at
220.
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to help identify common issues, patterns, and problems, and to serve
as a database for testing various aspects of regime theory. It may be
possible to discern particular factors central to regime formation in
the tax area, mirroring comprehensive efforts in the application of re-
gime theory to environmental law.30 1 Included in the group of new
case studies should be an example of "complete" failure to form a
regime, as well as examples in which the states were partially success-
ful in establishing a regime (perhaps by changing or limiting the pa-
rameters of their negotiations). Candidates for study include the
agreement of the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators on docu-
mentation for transfer pricing,302 advance pricing agreement pro-
grams,30 3 the European Union savings directive, 30 4 and efforts to limit
"harmful" tax competition. 305
Second, the role of epistemic communities in taxation requires care-
ful examination. Rather than approach this question solely through
the case studies suggested above, it would be useful to directly study
the major groups involved in international tax policy, including the
League of Nations, the OEEC, the OECD, the U.N., and the Interna-
tional Fiscal Association. How have they identified and clarified is-
sues, directed discussion, and shaped conclusions? In looking for their
influence, we should go beyond their direct roles in producing agree-
ments to consider more subtle contributions. For example, long
before an agreement is on the table, do these epistemic communities
raise the profile of issues by generating discussion and study? Do they
increase the general comfort level on various rules and outcomes by
presenting and reviewing them repeatedly and extensively? Based on
the double taxation case study, organizations that are part of the epi-
stemic community are worth our attention, are worth joining, and are
301 Young & Osherenko, note 60, at 223-61.
302 Pacific Association of Tax Administrators, Transfer Pricing Documentation Package,
at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ustransferpricing.com/PATAtransferpricingpackage.
pdf
303 The U.S. Advance Pricing Agreement Program ("APA" program) allows taxpayers
and governments to agree on the pricing and allocation of profits from related party trans-
actions in advance of the transactions. See Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526, 526. Follow-
ing the introduction of the APA program in the United States in the early 1990's, many
other countries have formally or informally instituted such programs as well. See Diane M.
Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing Agreements and the
Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 Mich. J. Int'l L. 143, 163-69
(2001).
304 The Savings Directive concerns the treatment of cross-border payments of interest
within the European Union. Council, Directive, 2003/48/EC, Savings Directive, 2003 O.J.
(L 157) 38, 39.
305 Beginning with the issuance of its 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition, the
OECD has sought to mobilize support for constraints on certain types of tax competition.
OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998).
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a good vehicle for advancing issues and ideas about which one has
strong views.
On a related point, the impact of individuals on regime formation in
taxation must be delineated. Influential individuals may be acting in-
side and or outside of an epistemic community or organization. This
issue can be approached in two directions, through direct study of crit-
ical figures in international tax (that is, mini-biographies), and through
an awareness of any individual actors in the case studies undertaken
(for example, tax competition).
Finally, two connected issues that only have been hinted at so far
deserve analysis-the impact of the domestic tax and political envi-
ronment on formation of regimes, and the role of sovereignty in re-
gime formation and regime failure. Asking about the domestic
environment acknowledges that states are not monoliths and may not
speak with a single voice or follow a single vision. (In a limited way
this occurred in the tension between the views espoused by Adams
and by Seligman on double taxation).306 States are not merely actors
on the international stage; they are entities responsive to and in many
cases shaped by their domestic sphere. One of the many threads in
domestic political rhetoric on international tax is the question of sov-
ereignty: Whether a regime would or could impinge on the nation's
sovereignty in tax matters? The power of these fears to direct interna-
tional tax policy may depend on the constellation of domestic political
forces and the particular international tax regime at issue.
V. CONCLUSION
As nations devote more attention to the coordination of their inter-
national tax activities, our understanding of how these efforts are
structured, shaped, and influenced becomes critical. Regime theory
from the international relations literature offers an important frame-
work for examining the agreement process between and among na-
tions. Through analysis of international tax case studies, we can
identify common themes in the regime experience in international tax
that may be generalized and may enable us to predict where and when
regime formation efforts are likely to be successful and how that suc-
cess can be fostered. This work is not only the domain of tax scholars.
Just as researchers in international relations have developed extensive
case studies in other substantive fields, they should now turn to taxa-
tion. This expansion not only offers a new realm in which to test and
apply their theories, it also offers an opportunity to examine regime
formation in a context in which the states have a special role (revenue
306 Graetz & O'Hear, note 14, at 1037.
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collector). Ultimately, work from researchers in both taxation and in-
ternational relations theory should together guide states in their ef-
forts to design and implement international tax policies.
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